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 To combat the terrorist threat the United States faces in Yemen and Pakistan, 
Remotely Piloted Vehicles have been employed to deter, deflect, and defend.  These 
RPV’s operate thousands of miles from the closest military base in states that are not 
officially engaged in war.  In these sovereign lands, cultures that have existed for 
thousands of years are torn between corrupt governments, terrorist insurgency cells, 
and sudden death from above.  Reports on whether the aerial assassination campaign 
has impacted terrorist activity have been interpreted very differently among analysts.  
This thesis will explore how RPV’s have affected foreign policy, terrorism, and the 
security threats these places pose to the United States.  Answers to these questions 
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION 
In 1917, the United States used airplanes to help win the Allied battle in WWI, 
just ten years after they were invented.  One hundred years later, the United States is 
using the War on Terror as the battleground to test its newest weapon.  It goes by many 
names: drone, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), or Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV).  For 
the purposes of this work, RPV or RPS (remotely piloted system), will be used.  
Remotely piloted vehicle refers to the drone itself, whereas remotely piloted system 
encompasses all support, processing, analysis, and dissemination infrastructure.  Above 
all, the drone is a piece of technology that has raised controversy and adamant defense.  
RPV aerial strikes have been chosen as the most effective method with the highest cost-
benefit analysis for anti-terror operations in Pakistan and Yemen.  Many issues have 
developed as RPV’s are used more often, including their moral and legal status.  More 
importantly, is their use the best possible solution to security threats in these two 
states, and if not, then what is?  This thesis will deal with answering these questions, as 
well as provide a historical and cultural context for the arguments.  By comparing two 
case studies of RPV usage- Yemen and Pakistan- an objective conclusion will be 
delineated as to how RPV’s have impacted radicalization in these two states and what 
this means for U.S. national security.  By using Yemen and Pakistan as a model, RPV’s as 
a strategy of unconventional warfare will be deduced. 
There are two different RPV’s that are in operation by the United States, the 
Predator and the Reaper, both being medium altitude, long endurance unmanned aerial 
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vehicles.  They are kinetic, offensive, highly aggressive counterterrorism tools which 
policy makers intend to be used abroad against people who present a security threat to 
the United States while maintaining the sovereignty of the state where the strike takes 
place.  Currently, the United States has approximately 7,500-8,000 RPV’s that are used 
for a wide variety of missions, however only around 300 of these possess strike 
capabilities.  Those RPV’s with strike capabilities carry a payload of two to four Hellfire 
anti-tank air-to-ground missiles and two five hundred pound bombs, with the weapons 
capable of in-flight laser guided control or GPS guidance for increased accuracy.  When 
fired, these weapons travel faster than the speed of sound so that their targets will not 
hear them approachi.  An unarmed Predator can persist over a target for up to forty 
hours of surveying, while a fully armed Predator, or its larger cousin the Reaper, can 
remain aloft for fourteen hoursii.  In 2012, approximately 420 targeted killings were 
conducted in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia, 95% of which were carried out by RPV’siii.  
Their increased use by the United States, ambiguity and the clandestine policy 
surrounding this technology demonstrates that RPS’s are topic of vital importance.  
While international law is not included in the scope of this work, U.S. RPV policy 
undoubtedly affects global policy pertaining to this tool of war. 
Section one will provide a base for all future chapters by outlining a brief history 
of the U.S. RPV program, and terrorist organizations in Yemen and Pakistan, in addition 
to their growth or decline over time.  This section is vital for producing an informed 
decision on how RPV’s have directly impacted terrorism in these two states.  Section 
two will review policy and procedures for RPV usage in Pakistan and Yemen.  This will 
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include primary location, strike sanctioning, and any status of forces agreement (SOFA) 
or other type of formal understanding the United States might have with either Yemen 
or Pakistan.  Section three will examine how RPV strikes have affected radicalization in 
these two states, including civilian and militia death ratios.  This section will compare 
the current threat posed by terrorist cells in Yemen and Pakistan, compare that to the 
threat prior to RPV usage, and then use all of this information to extrapolate the future 
trajectory of security threats.  The work will culminate with a section devoted to areas 
for future research, including policy.  Additionally, the possibility of a null hypothesis 
would answer what might happen if RPV strikes suddenly ceased, or were replaced by 
kill/capture missions and how this would affect security threats in these regions.  











SECTION II: HISTORY 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DRONE 
Remotely piloted vehicles have developed over time from ungainly, fragile, 
remote controlled surveillance tools, to one of the most highly advanced pieces of 
equipment, capable of delivering a swift death.  The story began during WWII, when a 
top commander in what was then the U.S. Army Air Forces, General Henry “Hap” 
Arnold, developed an unprecedented new way to attack U-boat stations and other 
heavily fortified German positions.  He turned old B-17 and B-24 bombers into remotely 
piloted aircraft and loaded them with explosives.  Later, Arnold wrote in a memo to his 
staff, “If you can get mechanical machines to do this you are saving lives at the outset” 
and declared that “the next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in them at 
all”iv.  This prediction partially came true during the Vietnam War when the United 
States used remote controlled drones to carry out high-altitude photo reconnaissance 
missionsv.  Their success encouraged research on the new technology.  These early 
surveillance drones were far more accurate than the alternative, satellites, whose 
intelligence was limited by their orbit and cloud obstruction.  As time went on, future 
missions for RPV’s included extensive use in the Balkan Wars, where they were useful 
in tracking the genocide of Bosnian Muslims, and then for tracking the new radical 
terrorist Osama bin Laden in the early 2000’s.  It was around this time that the 
Pentagon and CIA began developing plans to arm the RPV so that an entire mission, 
from tracking, monitoring, to an eventual strike, could be carried out by a single vehicle. 
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 It was the search for Osama bin Laden in early 2001 that provided the impetus 
for the project of arming the reconnaissance RQ-1Predator.  Replicas of typical Afghani 
houses were built in the Nevada desert so that tests for the multimission MQ-1 Predator 
would include these circumstances.  However, once the armed Predator had reached 
the end of its testing phase, both the Air Force and the CIA were reluctant to fly what 
they felt was an awkward, unproven weapon that was unique and morally ambiguousvi.  
Jurisdictional arguments over who would fly the weaponized RPV continued until the 
project was finally shelved during a meeting of government officials held on September 
4, 2001.  Many critics look back on this period of time and argue that the equivocation 
over arming RPV’s resulted in lost opportunities to killing Osama bin Laden and his key 
associates, possibly disrupting or even preventing the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
Policy precedence for drones began when the Carter administration banned any 
involvement in assassination in Executive Order 12036.  The Reagan administration 
later banned any assassination in EO 12333, which states that “No person employed by 
or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to 
engage in, assassination”vii.  These were later amended by the Clinton administration, 
which permitted ‘lethal’ counterterrorism actions against a list of named targets.  
However, it was made clear that assassination was only to be approved as a last resort 
if capture was not deemed “feasible.”  Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the 
Bush administration further amended EO 12333 by removing the named list of targets 
as well as the “feasible” capture caveatviii.  It became apparent that assassination was 
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going to be policy during the War on Terror, and it was to be carried out by the United 
States Government at the President’s discretion. 
 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC) are generally the organizations that carry out aerial targeted assassinations and 
signature strikes via RPV in Yemen and Pakistan.  The CIA and JSOC are used rather 
than military units in order to offer plausible deniability; these agencies are less 
accountable under U.S. law and therefore can afford less transparencyix.  JSOC was 
created following a failed mission to rescue hostages held at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran 
as a result of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  The Pentagon recognized the need for a 
unified, fully capable, and highly qualified special operations team that would have its 
own aircraft, soldiers, and intelligence so that future similar missions might prove more 
successful.  Thus, in 1980 JSOC was born in order to fulfill the need for the President to 
have access to a small private army for unconventional, clandestine missions.  The CIA 
and JSOC have also been accompanied by private Blackwater (currently renamed XE 
Services) military forces to supplement CIA and Pentagon forces, particularly during the 
height of the Iraq war when governmental resources were thinx.  This amalgam of 
forces became the infrastructure for post 9/11 responses in Afghanistan as well. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN 
 The Fund for Peace currently ranks Yemen as the 8th least stable state globallyxi.  
While this is the most Yemen has improved since 2007, according to the organization, it 
is clear that Yemen faces systemic challenges to improved stability which would reduce 
the number and growth of terrorist organizations.  Although current tension between 
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former North and South Yemen is often the cause of regional destabilization and 
violence, Yemen’s territorial unity has been the exception rather than the rule across 
centuriesxii.  Yemen’s internal conflict is almost entirely political.  Frustration with a 
government that does not provide for its people is high within the populace.  While 
Houthi insurgents in Northern Yemen are Shi’ia and AQAP militants are Sunni, their 
mutual disparity lies in political aspirations, not sectarian disagreements.  Yemen also 
has no history of warlordism or clan warfare, nor are there linguistic or cultural 
disagreementsxiii.  Although Yemen has a large coast, there is no standing water inland, 
virtually no infrastructure and, unlike other states on the Saudi peninsula, Yemen has 
very little oil to capitalize on.  All of this has contributed to Yemen’s extreme poverty.  
Yemen is one of the region’s oldest cultures, home to the infamous Queen of Sheba and 
the fictional Scheherazade who narrated “One Thousand and One Nights”.  Finally, 
Yemen, including its large diaspora, is fiercely loyal. 
 Sociologically, Yemeni society today consists of a single segmentary lineage 
system, defined by anthropologists as a society with individual clans linked by common 
descent.  In the case of Yemen this common decent originates from one of the main 
groups of Arabs, the Qahtanxiv.  There are seven regional groups, although there is 
considerable cultural mixing at the boundaries.  The northwest highland region 
centered on the periphery of the flat mountain plain of Sana’a is surrounded by steep 
mountains in the south, east and west, and the Saudi Arabian border to the north.  The 
tribal men in this region are often seen wearing a traditional curved dagger in their 
belts.  In this high elevation, the state’s supply of qat is grown, a leaf that, when chewed, 
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produces a mildly intoxicating effect.  The west coast region is heavily influenced by 
African customs and traditions, particularly Eritrean and Ethiopian.  The region boasts a 
large fishing industry as well as the historical coastal city of Mocha, where the drink 
received its namesake.  The western midlands are dominated by mountains and valleys.  
It is where many of Yemen’s factories are located and it has the largest agricultural 
industry in the state; it is therefore one of the wealthiest regions.  The southwest 
lowlands is where the port city Aden is located, and although the city is often viewed as 
a stark contrast to the rest of the state, having a more metropolitan, liberal culture, the 
surrounding villages remain steeped in traditional values.  The mid-southern region has 
remained close to its original tribal roots despite governmental shifts over time.  It is 
where the provinces of Abyan and Shabwa are located and is, generally speaking, a 
resource-poor area.  The central interior is referred to as al-Rub al-Khali, or the ‘empty 
quarter’.  It is believed in Islamic culture to be the region ruled by the famous Queen of 
Sheba mentioned in the Bible and Quranxv.  Lastly is the eastern region.  The residents 
along the coast and inland in the wadi, or valley, represent the largest and most 
cohesive subnational group.  They have a very distinct culture, tradition, and dialect 
specific to the Hadrami people.  This is the region that Osama bin Laden’s father was 




Theologically, Yemen is 65% Sunni, which includes al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula and Shafi’i Muslims, and 35% Zaydi Shi’ias
xviii.  Zayd ibn Ali ibn Husayn’s followers 
asserted that he should have been the rightful fifth imam.  Shi’ia’s from Iraq, Iran, and 
Lebanon are often referred to as “twelver” Shi’ias, and take their name from a belief in 
the mystical disappearance of the twelfth imam.  “Twelver” Shi’ias have a conflicted 
relationship with Sunni’s over the martyrdom of Imam Ali’s son.  These “twelver” Shi’ia
xvii.  Zaydi Shi’ias are often referred 
to as “fiver” Shi’ia, named after the succession struggle in Iraq during the generation of 
the fifth Shi’ia imam in the early 8th Century
s 
dispute the claim of the Zaydi Shi’ias, who traveled to Yemen two centuries laterxix.  The 
first Zaydi who arrived in Yemen was at the invite of al-Medina to arbitrate a tribal 
dispute in the city of Sa’ada.  Although Zaydi’s are often referred to as Shi’ia, they are 
not Shi’ia in the traditional sense, nor does their current qualm concern conversion or 
religious doctrine. 
Yemenis initial north-south border delineation was drawn by cartographers and 
surveyors sent from the imperial capitals of London and Istanbul in the first decade of 
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the twentieth centuryxx.  However, neither the British nor Ottoman Empire’s ever 
exercised uniform power beyond using strategic cities for sea ports.  Prior to the 1960’s, 
Yemen had a series of imamates that overlapped in time and space, which followed the 
tradition of a divided rule.  This pattern was broken as the Soviet Union began to 
develop a sphere of influence over the South once the British had withdrawn in 1967.  
Northern Yemen, on the other hand, was dominated by two main highland tribes: the 
Hashid and Bakil, both of whom shared a staunch loyalty to the Zaydi imams who ruled 
since the late ninth century C.E.  That was until a coup d’état was launched by those 
loyal to Gamal Abdel Nasser, second President of Egypt and strong proponent of what 
he called the United Arabic Republic.  What ensued was the North Yemen Civil War, 
with the Bakil and Hashid tribes, as well as Saudi Arabia, maintaining support for the 
Zaydi imamate while the Shafi’i Yemeni’s and Egypt backed Socialist republican 
forcesxxi. 
 The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (commonly referred to as South 
Yemen), being Marxist itself, enjoyed financial backing from the Soviet Union.  South 
Yemen labored to unify lands that had previously consisted of more than twenty 
separate sultinates, emirates and shaykhdoms
xxiii.  In addition, to weaken 
tribal allegiances, the South Yemeni government also made revenge killings punishabl
xxii.  To integrate each region peacefully 
with no internal divisions and simultaneously assert governmental control, South 
Yemen’s earliest legislation banned the carrying of arms
e 
in state courtsxxiv.  After eight long years of civil war, North Yemen was unable to 
establish this sort of crucial rule of law, and remained deeply ingrained in a tribal 
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society where tribal feuds and revenge killings were, and continue to be, commonplace.  
Tribespeople have been for the most part self-governing in the fact that they imposed 
their own laws and ran their own prisons in the highlands of North Yemen.  North 
Yemen’s President, Ali Abdullah Saleh (1978-1990), ran the state like a giant tribe 
thriving off of underhanded deals and playing rivals against each other.  He often 
famously described his presidency as ‘dancing on the heads of snakes’xxv. 
 South Yemen, on the other hand, is largely composed of settled peasants with a 
hierarchical system of authority.  Despite being supported by the Soviet Union, many of 
these peasants resented the new, abrupt and ruthless security regime.  Hundreds of 
thousands fled to Saudi Arabia and North Yemen
xxvii
xxvi, while others sought revenge 
against the Soviet military in Afghanistan during the 1980’s.  It was these South Yemeni 
people who would travel thousands of miles to jihad.  What had begun as Soviet backing 
of the Communist government in Kabul had turned into an Arab struggle against 
invading atheists.  South Yemenis would then return home once fighting had ended in 
1989 to continue fighting the Yemeni communist government.  This was Yemen’s first 
taste of al Qaeda ideology.  It proved to be very strong, as according to Osama bin 
Laden’s former body guard, 95% of al Qaeda activists were either from Yemen or were 
ethnically Yemeni . 
 When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, South Yemen also lost its main 
benefactor.  The former President of North Yemen, Saleh, became the first President of a 
united Yemen in 1990.  There had been speculation both internally and internationally 
over the eventual unification of the state for decades.  However, the triumph of 
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accomplishing unification soon dissipated into chaos.  In 1992, nearly one hundred 
assassinations or attempts were carried out against Southern politicians by either 
Northern highland tribes’ members or formerly exiled South Yemenisxxviii.  In this 
environment of instability, Saleh chose to give support towards Southern Yemeni jihad 
fighters returning from Afghanistan who had their land taken from them during the 
transition to Socialism.  Saleh’s strategy was for these fighters, some of whom having 
connections with bin Laden, to eliminate any struggle against possible Socialist 
rivalsxxix.  The President would use these former jihadists fighting in Afghanistan to beat 
back Southern secessionists, Northern Houthi rebels who supported the revival of the 
Zaydi Imamate, and any other problematic domestic elements Saleh facedxxx.  Not only 
was al Qaeda finding a safe haven in Yemen to construct training camps in the South 
and gain membership and sympathy, it was actively welcomed during the early years of 
unificationxxxi. 
A decade after Yemen’s unification and the end of the first Gulf War in October 
2000, two men in a small boat pulled alongside the U.S.S. Cole and detonated five 
hundred pounds of C4 explosives, ripping through the destroyer and killing 17 sailors.  
The U.S. Navy ship had docked in Aden port to refuel during its mission of enforcing 
economic sanctions in Iraq that had been in place since the end of the Gulf War.  Many 
residents of Aden knew that the blast had some connection to bin Laden, specifically a 
local military group called the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, who had joined bin Laden in 
Afghanistan’s mujahedeen during the 1980’sxxxii.  Yemenis were largely in favor of the 
attack, as the United States in Yemen at the time was associated with ongoing Israeli 
13 
 
violence against Palestinians, as well as the economic stranglehold placed on Iraq.  Prior 
to the attack, President Saleh had stonewalled the United States’ investigation of al 
Qaeda in Yemen; by this time, many members of the terrorist organization had intimate 
connections to the Yemeni governmentxxxiii
xxxiv
.  Saleh even refused to acknowledge the 
bombing as an act of terrorism for the first few days following the attack, claiming that 
the blast had resulted from an internal explosion aboard the vessel . 
 RPV strikes in Yemen can be traced back to a meeting between Saleh and 
President Bush in November just after the September 11 terrorist attacks.  In the 
meeting, the United States pledged Saleh millions of dollars in aid, helicopters, weapons, 





xxxv.  In return, Saleh, whose al Qaeda associations had been made public, allowed 
the United States secret authority to fly armed RPV’s in Yemen in order to target al 
Qaeda members seeking sanctuary inside the desert interior region of Marib .  One 
year later in 2002, the Bush Administration authorized a Predator drone to be sent to 
Yemen where it would use a Hellfire missile to obliterate its target: Qaed Salim Sinan al-
Harethi, the mastermind of the U.S.S. Cole bombing, along with five of his 
companions  including one American .  While the CIA’s operation to kill Harethi 
had the tacit approval of the Yemeni government, the strike itself had been carried out 
unilaterally by the United States .  Harethi’s death was a major blow to al Qaeda in 
the region; he was Osama bin Laden’s main contact in Yemen and had established al 
Qaeda’s first training camps therexl.  Yemen, thusly, marked the first use of U.S. RPV’s 
outside of the traditional theater of war following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN 
 Culturally, Pakistan relies heavily upon the importance of kinship that is rooted 
in a sense of collective solidarity for interest and defense.  A kinship group is 
inextricably bound with feelings of honor, prestige (or izzat), and shamexli.  A group that 
has been dishonored will reflect dramatically upon every aspect of the individuals’ lives.  
Shame and honor are often upheld in kinship groups by preventing or punishing any act 
or behavior the group finds to be sexually illicit among the women of the group, but also 
through political and economic advancement, and public status of the group.  The 
cultural system is so strong it dictates that a father will kill his daughter if she marries 
outside of her kinship group without permission.  The strength of Pakistan’s kinship 
networks is the foci of their loyalty, and has influenced the weakness of the state and 
government establishment.  Once this is understood, infamous Pakistani corruption can 
actually be interpreted as the ancient value of loyalty towards family and kinship tribes.  
For instance, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is comprised of the Bhutto family and 
the Awami National Party (ANP) represents the Wali Khan familyxlii. 
Pakistan boasts one of the oldest civilizations in the world, dating back at least 
5,000 years.  It was invaded over that time by the Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Arabs, 
Afghans, and Turks until the British folded the region that would become Pakistan into 
the British Raj in the 19th Centuryxliii.  The British had extended their rule as far north as 
they could in order to create a buffer zone for the encroaching Russian Imperial Army.  
However, they soon learned that the fiercely independent tribespeople of what they 
called the trans-Indus districts could not be governed the same as other protectorate’s, 
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and therefore relied on indirect rule over the Pakistanisxliv.  Pakistan’s northern border 
was created by the British in 1893 to demarcate a boundary between British India and 
Afghanistan.  Pakistan’s southern border was decided upon when the British removed 
themselves from the region in 1947.  The partition was drawn up by the Muslim League 
and the Indian National Congress in order to create two states, one with the majority 
being Hindu’s that would be India and the other with the majority being Muslim’sxlv.  
This latter state was named Pakistan; some argue that the name is an acronym for the 
people who lived there: Punjab, Afghani, and Kashmir; others claim that it is derived 
from combining the Urdu words pak which means ‘pure’ and stan which means ‘home’ 
or ‘country’. 
 Immediately following independence, Pakistan faced major issues that 
threatened its stability.  Tension with India on their eastern borders over Kashmir 
threatened to plunge India and Pakistan into war, and millions of Muslim refugees were 
flooding into Pakistan.  To make matters worse, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, ruling as 
governor-general and Pakistan’s first head of state, was terminally ill and would die 
within a year of assuming his position
xlvii
xlviii
xlvi.  Prior to independence, President Eisenhower 
referred to the land as ‘Jinnah’s Pakistan’ and described the man who almost single-
handedly created the state as ‘brilliant’ .  His death caused many leading analysts to 
question the future an independent Pakistan following his death .  As a testament to 
their tempestuous genesis, Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was 
assassinated in 1951, and the original capitol, Karachi, was eventually changed to the 
newly constructed Islamabad in 1960.  During this time of internal instability, India and 
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Pakistan would engage in three wars over the disputed Kashmir territory, in 1947, 
1965, and again in 1971, the last of which resulted in East Pakistan splitting off to form 
the sovereign state of Bangladesh. 
Pakistani politics have also proven as a root to the states’ divided society.  
Following Jinnah’s death and Khan’s assassination, Khwaja Nazimuddin, an East 
Pakistani who had been governor-general since Jinnah’s death, became the new Prime 
Minister in 1951xlix.  However, he was forced to yield just two years later to Muhammad 
Ali Bogra in 1953.  Bogra was subsequently replaced by Chaudhry Muhammad Ali in 
1955, and General Iskandar Mirza became governor-general at that time as well.  
Pakistan drafted a new constitution under Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and was also 
declared an Islamic republic.  Despite advancements, Prime Minister Ali remained in 
office just a year before he was succeeded by Hussein Shaheed Suhrawardy.  However, 
Suhrawardy’s attempts to form an alliance between East and West Pakistani political 
forces was so controversial he was forced to resign.  Dissatisfied with parliamentary 
democracy, governor-general Mirza proclaimed marshal law in 1958 and dissolved the 
National Assemblyl.  General Muhammad Ayub Khan was named chief martial-law 
administrator and twenty days later, forced the President to resign so that he could 
assume the position himself.  Ayub ruled Pakistan for over ten years.  While he made 
drastic land reforms, imposed restrictions on polygamy, and reinforced the inheritance 
rights of women, feudal relationships over land ownership remained in the countryside. 
 Following the 1965 war with India, Pakistan badly needed economic and 
military aid from the United States.  To end the conflict, the Soviet Union interceded to 
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mediate, resulting in the Tashkent Agreement which called for a cease fire between 
India and Pakistan.  Unsatisfied with the Tashkent Agreement, resentful Pakistanis 
forced Ayub to resign in 1969 and Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto resigned as well.  
Ayub transitioned power to the chief of the Army, General Agha Muhammad Yahya 
Khan, who once again declared martial law.  Due to severe instability caused by Bengali 
succession in the 1970’s, Yahya relinquished power back to Bhutto in 1971, and Bhutto 
gave diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh in 1974.  Under Bhutto, Pakistan once again 
went through a series of reforms.  Basic insurance companies, domestically owned 
banks, and schools and colleges were nationalized, and further land reforms were 
implemented to benefit tenants and middle-class farmers.  These reforms ultimately 
earned Bhutto the enmity of capitalists and religious elements and a coup was 
eventually staged in 1977 by the Army Chief of Staff Muhammad Zia ul-Haq.  Zia 
assumed Presidency in 1978 and established martial law and Sharia law in Pakistan 
which included maximum penalty for adultery, defamation, theft, and consumption of 
alcohol.   
Just three years later, Pakistan, with the help of the United States and Saudi 
Arabia, joined Yemen to become embroiled in the Afghan war against the ‘godless’ 
Soviet military.  Those Pakistanis who had once lived in the same borderless region as 
Afghanis felt personally dishonored by the Soviet invaders.  However, once the Soviets 
had been driven out of Afghanistan in the late 1980’s, a power vacuum in Afghanistan 
left the state vulnerable and poverty stricken.  Groups of students (talib is the singular, 
taliban is the plural Arabic word for student) amalgamated to try and create law and 
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order in Afghanistan.  Not only did Pakistan’s state run Inter-Service Intelligence agency 
funnel money to the Taliban, but the CIA as wellli.  The ISI boldly exerted distributive 
control over CIA money and arms in Afghanistan, which the U.S. eventually consented 
to, helping the ISI to expand enormously during the 1980’s and become a major political 
entity in Pakistanlii.  Eventually the Taliban took over Kabul, although their prejudices 
against other ethnic groups and women became immediately and painfully apparent.  In 
this post-war chaos, nearly 5 million Afghani’s, including members of the Taliban group, 
would cross over into Pakistan as refugees who brought with them droves of 
Kalashnikov’s and drugsliii.  Following the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban, once labeled as freedom fighters, metastasized into a serious threat on the local 
and state level.  Although the ISI had maintained a certain degree of control over these 
military groups, they began to lose control in 1997 when Taliban leader Mullah 
Muhammad Omar handed over all training camps for foreigners in Afghanistan to 
Osama bin Ladenliv.  Once the Soviets withdrew in 1989, those militant groups such as 
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, founded in 1984, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, founded in 1982 to 
jihad in Afghanistan, returned and redirected their efforts towards the conflict over 
Kashmir.   
After the 1988 general elections, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of former Prime 
Minister Bhutto, became Prime Minster and the first woman to head a modern Islamic 
state.  Just two years later in 1990, President Ishaq Khan dismissed Bhutto’s 
government, charging misconduct.  Nawaz Sharif assumed the position of Prime 
Minister, however Bhutto was re-elected in 1993.  In 1996, Bhutto was once again 
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dismissed under charges of corruption, she went into exile, and an interim Prime 
Minister was appointed.  A military coup in 2000 resulted in General Pervez Musharraf 
assuming Presidency in 2001.  Musharraf’s Presidency was largely volatile.  He survived 
four assassination attempts in five years, and deep bitterness was instilled among 
Pakistanis when Musharraf ordered government troops to raid Islamabad’s Red 
Mosque in 2007, killing 70 Islamic militantslv.  In 2006, Benazir Bhutto returned in 
order to seek reelection as Prime Minister but was assassinated in 2007, killed along 
with twenty others, in Rawalpindi during a campaign rally.  These incidents led to 
Musharraf’s resignation on the eve of his impending impeachment.  A coalition 
government resulted in Nawaz Sharif becoming Prime Minister and Asif Ali Zardari, 
Benazir Bhutto’s widower, became President.  Zardari incidentally had spent eleven 
years in jail on corruption charges.  Zardari did not run for reelection in 2013, allowing 
the Presidency to pass to Mamnoon Hussain. 
THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS OF PAKISTAN 
Over time, a buffer area developed known as the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA) within Pakistan along its border with Afghanistan.  These tribal areas act 
almost as a separate entity to Pakistan.  One tribesman explained his national identity 
following Pakistan’s split from Bangladesh: “I have been a Pashtun for six thousand 
years, a Muslim for thirteen hundred years, and a Pakistani for twenty-five”lvi.  Tribal 
identity in the FATA, a segmentary lineage system on the periphery of a state and its 
sovereign government, is the most dominant force.  They have their own code of honor, 
which varies by tribe, with the paramount principle being the law of hospitality to 
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guests, be they friend or enemy.  Another strong force is the tribal code, called 
Pukhtunwali meaning ‘way of the Pukhtun’, is that of revenge.  “When serious wrongs 
do occur – such as murder, theft, or rape – revenge is taken to correct the wrong and 
restore honor”lvii.  Revenge and counter-revenge between clans has been known to last 
for generations. 
Primary strike locations for U.S. RPV’s were centralized in the FATA region, with 
the first occurrence recorded in June 2004, targeting local Taliban commander Nek 
Mohammad, who died soon after the strike from his woundslviii.  However, further 
strikes in Pakistan were postponed thereafter until 2005 when the CIA, CENTCOM 
(Central Command), and the Pentagon came to the realization that Pakistan was 
presenting more of a security threat than Afghanistan.  U.S. intelligence pointed to 
Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s second in command, also located in the FATA, to be 
among other top terrorist targets.  Because there were no agreements between the 
United States and Pakistan, there was no jurisdiction for military forces to enter the 
state for any reason, grounding even RPV strikes.  All of this changed when, in October 
of 2005, Pakistan suffered a massive 7.6 magnitude earthquake in which millions of 
Pakistanis were displaced from the damage.  JSOC and CIA forces were able to take 
advantage of the disorder by implanting operatives in order to cultivate informant rings 
and collect information on al Qaeda as part of Operation Cannonball, laying down 
groundwork for future RPV usagelix. 
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 Figure 2lx 
It was during this time in late 2005 and going into 2006 that RPV’s became the 
primary weapon for the U.S. in Pakistan.  Although even well into 2006, the Pakistani 
government, unwilling to disclose to its people the U.S. RPV campaign, took full 
responsibility for each strike by claiming the strikes were Pakistani bombers
lxiii
lxi.  One of 
President Bush’s final decisions regarding the War on Terror was to “turn up pressure 
on extremists” using the Predator RPV in 2008lxii.  CIA director (DCIA) Michael Hayden 
and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell expressed their concern 
with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, prior to his resignation, over a possible 
merger between al Qaeda and Pashtun extremists.  This threat along with the threat 
Musharraf felt from Taliban members convinced the President to agree to an expansion 
of the parameters for RPV strikes.  The new agreement allowed the CIA virtually 
unrestricted authority to conduct strikes in the border FATA region .  Then, in 2009, 
the United States authorized a higher rate of use for the RPS as an extension of 
President Obama’s decision to deploy additional troops to Afghanistan. 
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SECTION III: U.S. POLICY 
 There is some discrepancy over policy surrounding particularly the oversight of 
RPV strikes.  In broad, general terms, the CIA is expected to report to the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees on their activities, while the JSOC reports to the House 
and Senate Armed Services Committees.  There has been some speculation by policy 
analysts that the Director of the CIA is responsible for signing off on any RPV strikes 
conducted by the CIA itselflxiv.  Some sources have claimed that the CIA has all the 
necessary approvals within its counterterror center to fire missiles within Pakistan 
when an al Qaeda target is spotted; thus the CT center does not necessarily require 
approval from the White House, Pakistani authorities, or even the CIA director to 
initiate a strike in this instancelxv. 
In February 2013, the confidential ‘white papers’ were obtained by media 
sources which detail the conditions for an RPV strike carried out by the CIA against 
senior operational leaders of al Qaeda or an associated force.  The memo outlined three 
specific requirements that must be met for a strike to be judged lawful.  Firstly, the 
target must be considered an imminent threat.  However, this definition is very 
expansive, as a threat can be considered imminent even if it does not have “evidence 
that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate 
future”lxvi.  The phrase ‘imminent attack’ must be used in order to comply with national 
and international law.  National law sanctions an attack on an imminent threat through 
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force passed by Congress on September 14, 
2001.  The Joint Resolution allows for the use of “all necessary and appropriate force 
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against those nations, organizations, or persons he (the President) determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons”lxvii.  In terms of international law, 
targeting an imminent threat would be sanctioned under the United Nations Charter 51 
which accepts that a sovereign state has the inherent right of individual or collective 
lxviiiself-defense .  The second criteria that must be met for a strike is that the capture of 
the target must be infeasible.  This is understood to mean that “undue risk to U.S. 
personnel conducting a potential capture operation” cannot take placelxix.  Lastly, 
strikes must be in accordance with the fundamental law-of-war principles and does not 
violate principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity (i.e. the 
avoidance of unnecessary suffering)lxx.  Whether or not these same criteria apply to 
JSOC forces is unknown. 
Within the United States Air Force, which conducts RPV strikes in the theater of 
war, there are publicized and non-publicized resources to ascertain the amount of 
criteria that must be met before a strike can take place.  The Joint Fires and Targeting 
Handbook, a public document published by the Joint Forces Command, lists general 
rules for any strike carried out by any military weapons system.  Sources have 
described criteria specific to RPS’s to include: reliability of intelligence that identified 
the target (in some cases, verification from two independent sources), and the number 
of and status of other people in the area.  “The less reliable the information and the 
greater the potential collateral damage, the more people review the information and the 
higher the rank of those in the military who must approve the strike – all the way up to 
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the Commander in Chief.”lxxi  In cases where innocents have been killed as collateral 
damage, these individual strikes are reexamined.  While this is how the Air Force 
conducts its RPV strikes, it is possible that the CIA and Pentagon also employ these 
same guidelines. 
A major development in RPV policy occurred in 2008 as part of the relaxation of 
rules under which the CIA could launch a strike.  This development has commonly been 
referred to as ‘signature strikes’ because all that was required to strike was for the 
target to match a ‘signature’ type of vehicle or safe house typical to al Qaedalxxii.  The 
Defense Department has opted to refer to these types of strikes as terrorist
lxxiii.  The new policy removed the standard of proof needed 
before an RPV could strike.  Al Qaeda lxxiv
lxxvi.  Although the Guantanamo Detention Facility continues to be fully 
operational, targeting terrorist suspects and killing them in the field has lowered the 
number of detainees and enabled the process of closing the facility.
-attack-
disruption-strikes (TADS)
 is structurally not a top heavy organization ; 
these types of strikes aiming at large convoys or houses are meant to quickly decimate 
low ranking memberslxxv.  The increase in RPV strikes could be attributed to President 
Obama’s Executive Order to close the Guantanamo Detention Facility early in his 
presidency
 
In September, 2012, President Obama addressed drone strikes specifically in his 
speech to the National Defense University.  The President announced that “By the end of 
2014…the progress we’ve made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for 
unmanned strikes” and that “beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its 
associated forces.  And even then, the use of drones is heavily constrained.”  He 
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explained that “America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture 
individual terrorists,” and that “America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our 
actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty.”  
The President went on to say that “America does not take strikes to punish individuals; 
we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American 
people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the 
threat.”  The last caveat President Obama mentioned with respect to drones was that 









 However, beginning in 2013, a chorus of international and domestic outcry over 
the legality of RPV strikes resulted in a steady decline of their use in Pakistan and 
Yemen.  As reports over RPV usage and casualty numbers began to surface, it was 
evident that policy must conform in some degree to the public.  Any subclass on drones 
is not mentioned in weapon treaties or any other legal instrument of international or 
humanitarian law.  Currently, international lawmakers still struggle over whether 
armed RPV’s should have their own unique set of regulations to be accountable to.  The 
United Nations has mandated that there is ‘no need’ to create new laws when deploying 
RPV’s for extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations of any statelxxviii.  Critics of the 
U.S. armed aerial assassination campaign, from law professors and academic experts to 
Senators, have pointed out flaws in the White Papers.  These include the elastic and 
ambiguous use of the word ‘imminent’ in the document, as well as the fact that RPV 
strikes under the jurisdiction of JSOC and CIA are classified and the rules governing 









SECTION IV: YEMEN 
RPV POLICY AND USAGE 
 In Yemen, some RPV strikes are conducted by the CIA whereas others are 
managed by the Department of Defense, specifically the JSOC.   These RPV’s have been 
known to fly out of Air Bases located in the Seychelles, Djibouti, and southern 
Ethiopialxxix.  The United States does not necessarily have military installations at each 
of these locations, with the exception of Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. 
 Prior to the signature strike policy, RPV’s in Yemen were used solely for strategic 
assassinations, including Harethi, whom the U.S. government had originally requested 
to be arrested by the Yemeni government.  It was only when the Yemeni government 
failed to detain Harethi that the CIA deployed an armed RPV to assassinate the target
lxxxi
lxxx.  
Since Bush met with Saleh in 2001, the United States had protected Saleh’s regime.  
However, once the threat Harethi had posed was eliminated, al Qaeda in Yemen 
decreased significantly along with U.S. aid.  The announcement was made in the fall of 
2005 by the United States and the World Bank that aid would be cut nearly in half due 
to the fact that democracy in Yemen had stalled and that corruption was still rampant 
within the government.  Saleh was baffled, particularly by the United States’ actions.  
Since 2001, he had done everything the United States had asked.  The list of names the 
CIA had given him had all been taken care of, Harethi had been killed, other al Qaeda 




Al Qaeda slowly began to resurrect itself as Saleh’s Presidency began to lose 
popularity in Yemen.  However, it wasn’t until the Arab Spring reached Yemen in 2011 
that the state began to crumble and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) began to 
assert itself as a dominant threat.  U.S. supported units were pulled back to Sana’a for 
defense of Saleh and his unpopular regime.  AQAP began controlling large swaths of 
land, particularly in the Abyan Provence, in the uncontrolled chaos and were marching 
on Aden.  To end the conflict, in May the United Nations and the United States tried to 
broker a deal with Saleh which would guarantee that he would not be prosecuted for 
any crimes he might have committed during his presidencylxxxii.  Saleh refused the deal, 
which sparked a two week street war in Sana’a that culminated when a bomb ripped 
through the mosque Saleh was praying at within the presidential palacelxxxiii, leaving 
him with severe burns on 70% of his bodylxxxiv. 
 President Obama had been explicit in his desires for the United States in Yemen: 
they were not to get involved in domestic conflict, they would not implement signature 
strikes, and there would be no Yemen campaignlxxxv.  Rather, the U.S. President insisted 
on continuing to implement calculated, surgical strikes against AQAP’s top leaders.  
Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan along with the head of U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) General James Mattis produced a list of human targets for the policy.  In 
late 2011, the Obama administration finally decided to pull out nearly all of the U.S. 
military personnel in Yemen, including those who had been stationed there to train 
Yemen’s counterterrorism forces.  It was becoming evident that Ali Abdullah Saleh was 
no longer a profitable alliance.  Yet, the United States did not want to risk ground 
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troops.  With Saleh’s medical absence, President Obama approved of two surgical 
strikes, one targeted the American born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, the other was against 
Egyptian AQAP member Ibrahim al-Banna.  A fleet of armed drones successfully killed 
Awlaki along with three other men.  Two weeks later, the strike for Banna was 
approved by President Obama.  Two Hellfire missiles were deployed and hit a group of 
men huddled around a campfire late at night on the outskirts of a town in the southern 
governorate of Shabwa.  Rather than killing Banna, the missiles had hit a group of 
teenagers, including Awlaki’s 16 year old American son Abd al-Rahman, who were 
having dinnerlxxxvi. 
 Following the strikes, protests continued to rage across Yemen while AQAP 
gained even more territory in Abyan and Shabwa until Saleh returned from his 
hospitalization and finally accepted the terms for his resignation.  His long serving vice-
President Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi replaced him as President of Yemen in February 
2012.  Hadi understood the opposition that faced him as President, and that he required 
staunch U.S. and international backing to remain President and survive.  In exchange for 
U.S. support and a promise to make combating al Qaeda his top priority, Hadi allowed 
the U.S. unfettered access to targets in Yemenlxxxvii
lxxxviii
.  In response, President Obama 
approved the use of signature RPV strikes in Yemen.  The coastal cities of Ja’ar and 
Zinjibar in the Abyan province that had been overtaken by Ansar al-Sharia were retaken 
by Yemeni government military forces in June 2012 .  This was with the help of 
fourteen U.S. RPV strikes in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces over the course of two 
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dayslxxxix.  Since signature strikes have been incorporated as part of RPS policy in 
Yemen, their volume has increased significantly as detailed in Figure 3. 
IMPACT ON RADICALIZATION 
 In 2002, following the RPV strike that killed Harethi, Saleh was already aware 
that his cooperation with the United States had thus far filled his prisons and alienated 
him with the tribal shaykhs.  His solution was to implement an al Qaeda rehabilitation 
program within the prisons.  Saleh put a young Yemeni judge in charge named 
Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal, who was famous for sentencing two Muslims to death for 
murdering a Jew.  This violated unwritten legal precedents and incited outrage at the 
time; Hamdi argued that his sentence had been rooted in the Quran, the Sunnah, and the 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad himselfxc.  For the next three years, Hamdi, using 
nothing but the Yemeni constitution and the Quran, worked tirelessly with hundreds of 
al Qaeda prisoners to convince them that the teachings of bin Laden were not in 
agreement with their Holy Book.  Slowly, prisoners were graduated from the program 
and allowed back into society.  Al Qaeda continued to remain dormant in Yemen during 
the course of Hamdi’s rehabilitation program.  “There was an interlude of a little over 
two years in which it appeared as though al-Qaeda had largely been defeated in Yemen,” 
Princeton University professor Gregory Johnsen, a leading U.S. expert on Yemen, 
recalled to the Senate Foreign Relations Committeexci. 
During this period of time, between 2002 and 2006, the Bush administration had 
redirected its focus on Yemen to that of the Iraq War and Saleh was preoccupied with 
Houthi uprisings in the North.  When an article was published in 2005 alleging that 
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three of Hamdi’s graduates had carried out suicide attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, 
the United States, wary of the program from the start, pressured Saleh into ending the 
program
xciii
xcii.  Just one month later, Nasir al-Wihayshi, bin Laden’s secretary and the 
future head of AQAP, and his fellow al Qaeda inmates began digging out of their tiny, 
overcrowded cell in Sana’a.  By February 3, 2006, the group of men had dug their way 
out of the prison and emerged inside a women’s bathroom in a mosque 50 yards 
away .  The prison had been Yemen’s version of a maximum security fortress, with 
regular cell checksxciv.  Twenty three prisoners escaped that day, two of whom were 
Jamal al-Badawi and Jabir al-Banna, listed on the FBI’s most wanted list.  This was the 
turning point for al Qaeda to begin rebuilding again. 
Under Wihayshi’s leadership, al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen would be methodically 
restructured and manned to sustain more ambitious new operations.  Harethi’s version 
of al Qaeda was weak, unorganized, and not sustainable; it wasn’t surprising that his 
branch of the terrorist organization had died with him.  Although had spent nearly a 
decade away with bin Laden in Afghanistan, he was originally from Yemen and still 
understood the labyrinth of Yemeni society.  He traveled across the state and recruited 
locally in small towns.  With elections in Yemen approaching, Saleh revealed little 
concern over the prison break, and the United States continued to treat Yemen as a 
secondary priority.  Five months after the prison break, the United States launched a 
major expansion for Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti from eighty eight acres to nearly five 
hundred with 1,500 personnel and served as a major hub for CIA and JSOC forcesxcv.  In 
spite of this, Wihayshi had written up a list of names for assassination that focused on 
32 
 
two groups of Yemeni military officers: those who tortured al Qaeda members and 
those who worked closely with the U.S.  Included in the list was Ali Mahmud Qasaylah, 
whom they believed was the contact responsible for the RPV strike on Harethi.  The 
assassination occurred just outside of the city of Marib, where the strike had taken 
placexcvi. 
 Al Qaeda in Yemen continued to gain momentum.  In the spring of 2006 
following the prison break, a string of bombings occurred at oil and gas facilities in 
Marib and Hadramoutxcvii.  In 2007, a top al Qaeda
xcviii, released an audio tape.  In the tape, Raymi announced Wihayshi 
as Yemen’
 operative in Yemen named Qasim al 
Raymi who had had been an instructor at an al Qaeda training camp and was one of the 
escaped prisoners
s al Qaeda emir and warned against the dangers of negotiating with Saleh’s 
governmentxcix.  Al Qaeda then released the first issue of a bi-monthly journal Sada al-
Malahim, roughly translated as “The Echo of Battles,” on the internet in January, 2008c.  
Small attacks targeting tourists began in 2007 with eight Spanish tourists killed in 2007 
in Ma’rib, two Belgian tourists killed in 2008 in Hadramout, and then four South Korean 
tourists killed the following year in 2009 in Sana’aci.  These numbers do not include the 
groups’ Yemeni tourist guides. 
On September 17, 2008 al Qaeda jihadists staged their most dramatic attack 
against the United States since the U.S.S. Cole bombing.  Following three failed attempts 
and the second attack in six months, half a dozen suicide bombers drove two police cars 
through the outer ring of the U.S. Embassy compound’s reinforced perimeter defenses 
and detonated the explosives strapped to their bodiescii.  Although no American’s were 
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harmed, four civilians and six security guards, nine Yemenis and one Indian, were 
killed.  Notable failed plots include the attempted assassination of visiting South Korean 
diplomats in 2009, and the failed attempted assassination of a member of the Saudi 
royal family, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who also happened to hold the position of 
chief of counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia.  The infamous Christmas 2009 incident began 
when a Nigerian-Yemeni man named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab traveled to Yemen 
with the intention of forming connections with al Qaeda.  He then boarded a plane 
bound for Africa, then Amsterdam, Holland and on to Detroit with the intent to detonate 
a bomb concealed in his underwear.  The bomb failed to detonate, and Abdulmutallab 
was apprehended, tried and sentenced to life in prisonciii.  In 2010, highly sophisticated 
explosives disguised as 26 boxes of printer ink cartridges were hidden in two Qatar 
Airways passenger flights.  The planes landed in Dubai, and were in route to FedEx and 
UPS airplanes that would transport the boxes to Chicago when they were discoveredciv.  
It was in 2009 that al Qaeda decided to merge together in the region and rebranded 
themselves as something far more ambitious: al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP). 
Yet despite this activity, the United States was slow to resort to armed RPV 
attacks as they had been doing in Pakistan.  In 2002, the strike against Harethi was the 
first followed by a seven year hiatus in which the U.S. opted for other types of weapons 
platforms, including cruise missiles launched off of Naval vesselscv.  Four separate 
strikes occurred in 2009cvi, and while some sources claim that there were as many as 27 
possible strikes in 2010cvii, others assure that the U.S. RPV campaign entered into 
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another lull.  In 2011, chaos continued to erupt when President Saleh stepped down 
from office.  A confirmed total of 16 strikes were conducted as a result, and a possible 
six suspected strikescviii, with ten taking place in Abyan Province and the remaining six 
touching down in Shabwa Province, both located in the Southcix.  These numbers 
skyrocketed as AQAP continued to grow.  Tribal leaders, who could have been vital in 
suppressing al Qaeda had a neutral view of the organization.  If they felt threatened, 
their tribe would fight al Qaeda, however, the relationship for some tribes was 
symbiotic. 
Figure 5cx 
In 2011, when al Qaeda began taking control over large swaths of land in the 
South, they announced their strategy.  “Today we control Ja’ar…the largest problem that 
we face here is the lack of public services such as sewage and water, and we are trying 
to find solutions”.  The speaker, Adil al-Abab, explained that al Qaeda no longer wanted 
to be the nihilistic terrorist organization portrayed in the media, and acknowledged 
mistakes the organization had made in the past and that they would henceforth 
introduce themselves to new cities as Ansar al Sharia, translated as Supporters of 
Sharia (law)cxi.  Their ultimate goal was to overthrow the government which had thus 
far not been providing for its people and replace it with a government that would not 
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only do that, but also adhere to strict Sharia law.  “Why should we fight them?  Why?” 
Ali Abdullah Abdulsalam, a tribal leader from Shabwa, “If my government built schools, 
hospitals, and roads and met basic needs, I would be loyal to my government and 
protect it.  So far, we don’t have basic services such as electricity and water pumps.  
Why should we fight al Qaeda?” he asked againcxii.   
While these militants were able to bring with them some sort of progress, 
including repairing roads, restoring electricity, and distributing food, they also 
introduced Sharia courts.  These courts introduced brutal tactics as part of ‘hudud’, a 
fixed category of punishments for specific crimes that includes limb amputation and 
public flogging.  Ansar al Sharia publicly beheaded two men in Ja’ar they claimed had 
provided information to the United States to conduct RPV strikescxiii.  AQAP under the 
pseudonym Ansar al Sharia has also been known to crucify people who have been 
connected with selling information to the U.S.cxiv While AQAP leader Wihayshi does 
have a great deal of operational independence, al Qaeda’s current leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri has been known to assert pressure on Wihayshi to conduct terrorist strikes, 
just as Osama bin Laden was known to do to his affiliatescxv.  However, the actual plot is 
formulated by AQAP members, as any specific information relayed between Yemen and 
Pakistan could be easily intercepted.  One such plot was another attempted airliner 
bombing which was meant to target a high-profile American.  The plot was suspected to 
be revenge for two Yemeni members of AQAP who had been killed by an RPV strike the 
day prior.  However, the individual who was to carry out the bombing was in fact an 
undercover informer allied with Saudi intelligence and the CIAcxvi. 
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The following year in 2012, the number of RPV strikes skyrocketed to the 
highest amount to date.  A confirmed 33 strikes in Yemen were conducted, with the 
possibility of an additional 78, depending upon the source.  As the RPV strikes increased 
as well as the number of tactical successes, including the killing of Harethi and Awlaki, 
so did AQAP’s numbers.  In 2009 when AQAP officially formed, the organization had an 
estimated two to three hundred memberscxvii.  In 2013, the U.S. State Department 
estimated that AQAP had grown to nearly one thousand memberscxviii.  Overall, the CIA 
and JSOC have carried out seventy-nine RPV strikes in Yemen during the Obama 
administration and one during the Bush administration.  Conservative estimates 
average at 386 enemy and 84 civilian casualties, putting the total number killed 
between 630 and 876 as of August 13, 2013cxix.  In 2014, there has been an additional 
six to eight confirmed RPV strikes and thirteen more possible strikescxx. 
 Figure 6cxxi 
Number of strikes per region in Yemen 
Casualties in Yemen range dramatically dependent upon the source and what the 
source considered to be a militant versus a civilian.  Because Yemen is so remote and 
hazardous for both local and foreign journalists and reporters, accurate numbers are 
extremely difficult to determine.  According to The Long War Journal, 41 civilians were 
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killed as a result of U.S. RPV strikes in 2009, the highest number to date, with a total of 
95 civilians and 492 members of AQAP being killedcxxii.  However, other sources claim 




36-39 civilians killed in 2011, the highest number per year the organization claims, 
with 87 civilians killed thus far and 573 militants killed overall .  Many officials have 
speculated that the exponential increase of Yemen’s radicalization is due to the porous 
sovereignty Yemen experiences when it comes to US strikes as well as the number of 
civilian casualties.  The United States has never admitted to using RPV’s in Yemen  
and has therefore never apologized to the victims’ families; they have referred to any 
actions outside the theater of war as simply part of ongoing counterterrorism 
effortscxxv.  Emile Nakhleh, a former senior CIA officer was quoted explaining that “we 
might target radicals and potential radicals, but unfortunately…other things and other 
people are being destroyed or killed.  So, in the long run, it is not necessarily going to 
help.”  He went on to say that “these operations might be successful in specific cases, 
but I don’t think they necessarily contribute to deradicalization of certain segments of 
those societies” . 
 Figure 7 
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According to the Global Terrorism Database, terrorist attacks in Yemen 
remained relatively low until 2008cxxvii.  These numbers align with when al Qaeda in 
Yemen began conducting organized, systematic attacks following the 2006 prison 
break.  In 2001, seven terrorist attacks were reported, carried out by Yemenis in larger 
cities or in smaller surrounding towns.  In subsequent years, there were seven attacks 
in 2002; seven in 2003; no attacks were recorded in 2004, the year the United States 
began RPV strikes in the state; seven more attacks in 2005; finally, five attacks in 2006 
and seven attacks in 2007.  In 2008, these numbers changed dramatically with 22 
strikes that year alone.  Despite RPV strikes, they continued to rise exponentially until 
the last year the database recorded, with over 400 attacks in 2013.  Main perpetrators 
were largely AQAP and Houthi rebels, with the minority of attacks being carried out by 
Southern secessionist movements. 
In a move that further jeopardized Yemen’s fragile stability, Houthi rebels began 
an assault on Sana’a September 21, 2014 and seized government buildings, state media 
facilities and military bases.  In response, military units either broke apart, or sided 
with rebels.  The Houthi rebels, representing the Ansarullah political party, advanced 
swiftly upon the capitol, creating a decisive schism within the city.  Police protecting the 
building housing the Interior Ministry from surrounding Houthi militants were ordered 
to cooperate with the rebels “in consolidating security and stability”cxxviii.  The ministry 
went as far
cxxix.  On
 as to call the Houthi’s “friends of the policy in the service of the general 
interests of the homeland”  the other hand, Brigadier General Ali Mohsin al-
Ahmar along with military units considered loyal to him, provided a strong defense for 
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the city.  General Ahmar is a member of a powerful Yemeni tribe who is associated with 
the Sunni Islamist party Islah, the main political rival to the Houthi’s Ansarullah party. 
However, by nightfall on the 21st, even General Ahmar’s First Armored Division 
had been overtaken by the rebels, and the Generals’ whereabouts remain unknown.  
Prime Minister Mohammed Salem Basindwa, also linked to the Islah party, resigned 
during the fighting over his “concern to pave the way for any agreement reached 





President Hadi announced that the rebels had agreed to an immediate cease-fire and 
the formation of a new, technocratic national government which would include not only 
the Ansarullah party, but the Southern secessionist Herak movement as well as the 
Islah party .  Due to the ease with which the Houthi’s were able to capture the city, 
many have speculated that the group might have colluded with the Shiite Iranian 
government, or possibly even Hadi, in order that the group might eliminate figures the 
President views as a threat .  The successful government take over threatens 
renewed violence between Houthi’s and AQAP.  In a move to appease the Houthi’s, the 
United Nations brokered a peace deal between President Hadi and the rebels, Hadi 
appointed former UN envoy Khaled Bahah as Yemen’s new Prime Minister .  
Although the Houthi’s approve of the choice, they refuse to leave Sana’a, which is 
completely under their control, until the new government is formed.  Despite this major 
improvement, clashes between AQAP and Houthi’s continue.  On October 9, 2014, 
suicide bombers linked to AQAP killed at least 67 people in two separate attacks in 
eastern Yemen, and 18 Houthi’s were killed by the terrorist organization on October 
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SECTION V: PAKISTAN 
RPV POLICY AND USAGE 
 In Pakistan, all RPV strikes are conducted by the CIAcxxxvi
cxxxvii
cxxxviii
cxxxix.  Sometime between 2004 and 2013, 
JSOC forces were no longer tasked with RPV missions in Pakistan.  Although many 
witnesses claimed to have seen a ‘spy drone’ at the scene of the initial RPV strike in 
Pakistan which killed Nek Muhammad, Pakistani officials vehemently denied CIA 
involvement, claiming that it was in fact Pakistani forces had carried out the attack
.  Originally, the CIA and 
JSOC  flew RPV’s out of Shamsi Air Field located in the Washuk District of 
Baluchistan .  JSOC and contracted Blackwater employees would cull intelligence 
and create a strike list for JSOC and CIA RPV’s
cxl.  
Emboldened by their success, more strikes were authorized in 2005, including the 
killing of Haitham al Yemeni in May in North Waziristan, which was flat out denied by 
the Pakistani Information Minister.  Another strike in December killed Abu Hamza 
Rabia along with four ‘accomplices’, also in North Waziristan, and also denied by 
Pakistani officials.  When pieces of a Hellfire missile were found at the target site by 
local villagers, a Pakistani journalist working for PBS tried to cover the story.  During 
his investigation, he was abducted by Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence agency (ISI) 
and executed. 
While Pakistanis were beginning to understand the extent of U.S. involvement in 
the eradication of al Qaeda and Taliban members, the five cxliicxli to seven  reported 
civilians killed in the three strikes that took place in 2005 caused little disturbance 
among the general populace. The subsequent strike, however, proved less than 
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successful.  On January 13, 2006, three buildings were hit by ten Hellfire missiles in the 
village of Damadola in the Bajaur Agency of the FATA killing eighteen civilians including 
five women and five childrencxliii.  The intended target was Ayman al
cxliv.  As the number of strikes and 
the number of civilian casualties continued to grow exponentially, the more rage 
Pakist
-Zawahiri, al 
Qaeda’s second in command.  One survivor was quoted saying “my entire family was 
killed, and I don’t know whom I should blame for it”
anis felt over their infringed sovereignty and the more difficult it became for the 
United States to deny involvement. In a testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee three months after Robert Gates succeeded Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of 
Defense, Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, director for the Joint Staff, asserted that the 
United States had the authority to strike “against those demonstrating a hostile act” in 
Pakistancxlv.  Lt. General Lute specified that if enemy forces crossed the border from 
Afghanistan to Pakistan, that U.S. military commanders had full authority to engage, 




Somewhere between 117 and 128 RPV strikes took place in 2010, according to 
The Long War Journal and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism respectively, the 
highest number conducted in any state to date.  However, the following year the 
number dipped down to around sixty-four to seventy-five strikes.  The reason for this 
sharp decline of their use in Pakistan is often attributed to three incidents.  First, on 
March 17, 2011, an RPV strike killed between twenty-six and forty-four people in Datta 
Khel in North Waziristan, killing numerous civilianscxlvii.  Secondly was the SEAL team 
raid in May, 2011 in Abbotabad which killed bin
cxlviii
cxlix
 Laden, outraging the Pakistanis over 
their infringed sovereignty.  Thirdly was what has come to be called the ‘Salala incident’ 
in November, 2011, in which a joint U.S.-Afghan force, believing they were being fired 
upon by Taliban members, called in NATO air support.  One AC-130 and at least one F-
15 fighter opened fire on the group, which turned out to be members of the Pakistani 
Army; the friendly fire resulted in 24 Pakistani soldiers killed .  Since December, 
2011, all armed RPV’s with targets in Pakistan have been flown out of Afghanistan.  By 
2011, the United States no longer adhered to previously agreed upon parameters 
regarding how many RPV’s were allowed in Pakistan at one time and where they would 
be firing. The Pakistani government refused U.S. and NATO access to the Shamsi flight 
line in December, 2011, forcing the United States to move their operations to a newly 
created base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan .  These events led to a nearly two month lull in 
strikes, a stark difference compared to when RPV’s would take off almost hourly from 
Shamsi Airfieldcl.   
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Aside from scattered and infrequent periods of inactivity, the RPV campaign in 
Pakistan has been relatively steady.  The longest lull in strikes since 2006 occurred 
recently following a strike on December 25, 2013 which killed three to four people near 
Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan.  The strike marked the beginning of a six 
month hiatus for U.S. RPV strikes in Pakistan.  This coincided with peace talks between 
the Pakistani government and Pakistan’s Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP).  The Pakistani 
government requested that the CIA sharply curtail RPV strikes to allow for the peace 
talks to proceed after several failed attempts.  However, the CIA reportedly informed 
Islamabad that the agency would still pursue senior targets or carry out strikes if they 
felt an attack was imminentcli.  The hiatus was ended June 11, 2014 when an RPV strike 
killed 16, including four Uzbeks who were thought to be linked to an al Qaeda-allied 
movement in Uzbekistanclii. 
 Figure 9 
The amount of strikes continued to decrease in subsequent years.  In 2012, 
between forty-eight and fifty strikes occurred, in 2013, between twenty-seven and 
twenty-eight occurred, and thus far in 2014 a total of seven strikes have been accounted 
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for in Pakistan.  According to The Long War Journal, there have been a total of 361 
strikes in Pakistan since 2004, with 72% hitting targets in North Waziristan, and 23% 
hitting targets in South Waziristancliii.  At the height of the campaign, PRV strikes were 
hitting Waziristan as a whole once every four days.  In North Waziristan, the strikes are 
centered primarily around Mir Ali, Miranshah, and Datta Khel; in South Waziristan, the 
area around Wana in Wazir tribal territory and Makin in the Shabi Khel Mahsud tribal 
territory were high target locationscliv.  Initially, these strikes were focused in South 
Waziristan on high value targets, however, following Pakistan’s military invasion of the 
FATA in 2009 under intense U.S. pressure, strikes shifted to South Waziristanclv. 
 Pakistan was the first state that the United States decided to experiment with the 
success of the signature strike policy.  Beginning as far back as the closing months of the 
Bush administration, the CIA had conducted signature strikes against military aged 
males with known or unknown identities.  When President Obama assumed office, DCIA 
Michael Hayden convinced the new President of the effectiveness of signature strikes 
and while President Obama agreed, there were more stipulations for authorization.  
Whereas during the Bush administration when the deputy director or the head of the 
CIA’s CT center was all the authorization necessary to approve a strike, now the DCIA 
was required to sign off on each signature strikeclvi. 
IMPACT ON RADICALIZATION 
 Pakistan has numerous groups of militant organizations, often times 
corresponding to various family and tribal factions.  The largest Taliban groups based 
out of South Waziristan were being led by Maulvi Nazir and Waliur Rehman, prior to 
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their death via RPV strike on January 2, 2013 and May 29, 2013, respectivelyclvii.  Nazir
clviii
 
was noted for his unique style of leadership, using his influence to expel foreign 
militants from his area, including regions in Afghanistan, and even signing a non-
aggression pact with the Pakistani military in 2007 and 2009.  He was reportedly 
replaced by a fellow tribesman named Salahud Din Ayubi . Groups originating from 
North Waziristan are the Haqqani Network, Hafiz Gul Bahadar, and Abu Kasha al Iraqi.  
Other notable groups are Hakeemullah Mehsud from Orakzai and Faqir Mohammed 
from Bajaurclix.  All of these groups are encompassed under the umbrella term Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) which translates to Taliban Movement of Pakistan.  Beginning in 
2009, the RPV strikes specifically targeted those five largest TTP groups from North and 
South Waziristan.  The Haqqani Network and tribal areas run by the organization have 
been hit with 25% of all strikes in 2009; the Mehsud tribal area has been hit with 21% 
of all strikes since the RPV campaign began in 2004.  Overall, nearly 79% of all strikes in 
the FATA have targeted territories of these five tribesclx. 
     
Figures 10 and 11clxi 
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 Musharraf was determined to eliminate al Qaeda and its growing Pakistani 
support base at U.S. insistence.  However as of 2007, according to Ryan Crocker, the last 
ambassador to Pakistan under the Bush administration, there had not yet been any 
orders to raise the issue of Taliban sanctuariesclxii.  Therefore, Musharraf endorsed
clxiii
 
Taliban fighters.  Beginning in 2003, the ISI helped the Taliban raise funds in the 
Arabian Gulf states and facilitated their acquisition of guns and ammunition.  The 
intelligence organization even set up training camps manned by their own officers in 
Baluchistan, while concurrently cooperating with the CIA in apprehending al Qaeda .  
The Afghani Taliban used these bases in Pakistan to launch attacks in Afghanistan and 
recruit local Pashtuns.  Eventually, these local recruits formed their own branch of the 
Taliban, the TTP. 
Al Qaeda also has a presence in Pakistan along with Afghani and Uzbek Taliban 
members.  In addition, there are anti-Indian jihadists groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba 
that have working relationships with the Taliban and al Qaeda branches within 
Pakistanclxiv.  Lashkar
clxvi
-e-Taiba, led by Hafiz Saeed, has been designated as a terrorist 
organization by the United States, and has a widespread presence in Karachi and 
Lahore, becoming a major political force through an extensive philanthropic 
networkclxv.  Not only has the ISI trained the Lashkar-e-Taiba, but the Pakistani 
government has encouraged their recruitment efforts as part of their ongoing conflict 
with India.  The Pakistani government considers the Taliban groups formerly ran by 
Nazir, the Haqqani’s, Bahadar, and Hekmatyar, to all be non-threatening as none carry 
out attacks against the Pakistani state . 
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Radicalization in Pakistan, similar to the situation in Yemen, is closely linked to 
discontent with the government and police state actors.  The Pakistani government had 
welcomed Taliban support for a Muslim insurgency against Indian rule in Kashmir 
many timesclxvii
clxviii
.  Pakistani people feel little unifying nationalism under a corrupt and 
often changing government.  As Nawabzada Aurangzeb Jogezai, a Pathan tribal chieftain 
in Balochistan explained, “In Pakistan, only one institution works – the army…the 
police…are weak, corrupt and shambolic and dominated by the politicians…in the end, 
this country is always saved by the army” .  This complicated relationship Pakistani 
society feels about nationalism and identity within a relatively new state plagued with 
corruption has forced many to feel sympathetic towards the TTP.  The Taliban is 
comprised of, after all, fellow Muslims who are simply attempting to create a stable, 
reliable government in their eyes.  Other Pakistanis have viewed the TTP’s vituperative 
and often brutal action against the Pakistan military as personally offensive, driving the 
state into divisiveness. 
A survey conducted by the New America Foundation polling 1,000 residents 
representing each of the seven FATA districts between June 30, 2010 and July 20, 2010 
is revealing of the general attitude the local populace feels about RPV strikes and 
terrorist groups in their homelandclxix.  The survey was conducted using extensive 
quality control procedures, with respondents being selected using a multi-stage 
random stratified sampling methodology.  The poll has a +/- 3 percent margin of error 
at the 95 percent confidence intervalclxx.  While the poll revealed that three quarters of 
those surveyed opposed the use of RPV strikes within the FATA, each Agency produced 
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different numbers to come to this total.  In North Waziristan, where sixty three percent 
of RPV strikes between 2004 and 2010 were conducted, just 9.7 percent surveyed 
supported RPV strikes; whereas in Orakzai, where only one strike had ever been 
reported at the time of the poll, seventeen percent supported them.  In Bajaur, where 
three reported strikes had taken place, all during the Bush Administration, 46.5 percent 
supported the RPV campaign to eliminate terrorists.  On the other hand, support for the 
TTP, a homegrown terrorist organization, in North and South Waziristan is 34.2 percent 
and 45.2 percent, respectively.  However, when surveying the FATA as a whole, a mere 
nineteen percent support the TTP.  Al Qaeda, being an entirely foreign military entity, 
received little support.  As a whole, only 8.6 percent of FATA support the presence of al 
Qaeda. 
Following the September, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and amidst 
turmoil in neighboring Afghanistan, President Bush urged Pakistani officials to capture 
Taliban and al Qaeda members crossing into Pakistan.  Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani 
journalist explained the situation thusly: “The influx after 2001 of Al Qaeda and the 
Afghan Taliban into this region (FATA) has acted like an economic and religious engine, 
driving the process of radicalization”clxxi
clxxii
.  Initially in 2002, Pakistani army officers met 
with Wazir tribal ‘jirgas’, or a tribal council composed of the ‘mashar’, or elder .    The 
agreement that resulted from the meeting stated that the Pakistani military would 
allow tribesmen to handle the situation.  However, under intense pressure from the 
U.S., Pakistan launched a large scale military operation in Waziristan, which was 
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followed by a full-out invasion of South Waziristan in 2004 under the perspicacity that 
al Qaeda’s second in command Ayman al-Zawahiri was located thereclxxiii. 
While Pakistan has been historically a consistently insecure state since its 
independence from the United Kingdom, the political crisis that President Pervez 
Musharraf created before his resignation in 2008 was the opportunity extremist groups 
such as the TTP needed to expand their sphere of influence.  The chaos and violence 
that preceded the ousting of President Musharraf portended Pakistan’s current political 
meltdown as well.  The TTP movement began in December 2007, mostly in retaliation 






Waves of suicide bombers, 80% originating from South Waziristan, began hitting 
targets they perceived represented the central government including a Sri Lankan 
cricket team, and the police academy in Lahore .  In 2008, the district of Swat became 
the only district of Pakistan in which the TTP had complete administrative control .  
Attacks on Christians in 2013 were the highest in Pakistan’s history.  In September, 
2013, Taliban-linked extremists detonated a bomb at a church in Peshawar, killing over 
80 people in the blast .  “We did it,” explained Baitullah Mahsud of the Mahsud tribe 
and leader of a TTP branch, “as a retaliation for U.S. missile strikes off drones inside the 
Pakistan territory” . 
When questioned about RPV strikes in tribal areas on the Pakistani/Afghani 
border, former CIA RPV director Robert Grenier was forthright in his criticism of the 
strike campaign.  Grenier, who was head of the CIA’s counterterrorist RPV program in 
2005 and 2006, explained that “It’s not just a matter of numbers of militants who are 
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operating in that area, it also affects the motivations of those militants.”  Elsewhere in 
the highly disputed Kashmir region of Pakistan and outside of the RPV strike site, rebels 
seeking independence in Indian-controlled cities have joined forces with al Qaeda, thus 
empowering the extremist terrorist organization a larger geographic area.  “They now 
see themselves as part of a global jihad,”clxxix
clxxx
 Grenier described of al Qaeda in Pakistan.  
“They are not just focused on helping oppressed Muslims in Kashmir or trying to fight 
the NATO and the American’s in Afghanistan, they see themselves as part of a global 
struggle, and therefore are a much broader threat than they were previously.  So in a 
sense, yes, we have helped to bring about the situation that we most fear.”  
According to the Global Terrorism Database, terrorist activity in Pakistan began 
steadily increasing in 2004.  In 2010, the number of attacks began dramatically 
increasing to over 2,000 incidents in 2013 alone.  Not only did terrorism continue 
during periods of RPV strike inactivity until 2014, but they continued to increase.  In 
2014, in lieu of the United States’ decision to temporarily halt RPV strikes in Pakistan 
and Pakistan’s peace talks with the TTP, terrorist activity was met with a sharp 
declineclxxxi.  A few targeted strikes occurred early in the year, including the 
assassination of a senior police officer in January who had been campaigning against 
the TTPclxxxii.  However, beginning in June, TTP militants, along with members of the 
allied group The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, began strategically striking Pakistani 
military bases.  An airport in Karachi was attacked, killing thirty clxxxiii on June 8, 2014 , 
just days prior to the U.S. resuming RPV strikes in Pakistan.  Members of the TTP 
claimed that the attack was motivated by revenge over the killing of its leader, 
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Hakimullah Mehsud, who was killed in a U.S. RPV strike in November 2013clxxxiv.  A TTP 
spokesperson cited the attack was a
clxxxv
clxxxvi
 warning to the Pakistani government “that we are 
still alive to react over the killings of innocent people in bomb attacks on their 
villages” .  The attack followed failed peace talks between the TTP and the Pakistani 
government.  Also in June, militants fired on a plane attempting to land in Peshawar; in 
August, 2014 TTP linked militants attacked two Air Force bases in the western 
Pakistani city of Quetta . 
While all RPV strikes are targeting terrorist organizations and persons in 
Pakistan, not all terrorist organizations in the state target the United States.  Lashkar-e-
Taiba, for instance, one of the largest, most disciplined terrorist organizations in 
Pakistan, is almost entirely involved with fighting the Indian military on the Kashmir 
borderclxxxvii.  Pakistan invests financially into these organizations and offers them 
political asylum in order to avoid draining state military resources in their endless 
territory dispute.  Organizations such as this are affected very little by RPV strikes, 
indicating that there are examples where a correlation between RPV strikes and 







PART VI: FUTURE RESEARCH 
  RPV’s have demonstrated their unparalleled killing capabilities.  Their design 
enables the device to enter a state, loiter, kill, and exit without risking the lives of 
Americans.  However, RPV’s and the policy surrounding them have many caveats that 
could indebt the U.S. into greater insecurity.  In order to avoid this, there are a number 
of possible alternative policies which could alter the current trajectory for a more 
favorable resolution.  The first path to be explored will be the current one: were the U.S. 
to continue relying almost solely on RPV’s in Yemen and Pakistan, will the security 
threat ever diminish.  Secondly, if the U.S. to increase kill/capture missions in 
conjunction with fewer RPV strikes, will this at all affect the number of harmful 
terrorist organizations in these two locations.  Thirdly, a null hypothesis will answer 
whether a complete cessation of CIA and JSOC activities, primarily focused on RPV 
strikes, would in fact decrease the threat posed.  These possible future endeavors could 
greatly impact radicalization in Yemen and Pakistan. 
 Research has indicated that terrorism in Pakistan and Yemen is primarily 
directed at their equally corrupt government that provides little human security.  These 
are both structurally and systemically weak states with unstable governments and 
rampant poverty.  Deep resentment felt among the populace has led to years of 
unsuccessful coups in both states and civil wars in Yemen.  This regional political unrest 
has encouraged the growth of violent social behavior, directed internally and externally.  
Coupling the myriad of issues associated to fragile states with the fact that the U.S. is 
financially, diplomatically, and militarily supporting highly unpopular leaders in said 
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states creates a great deal of social tension.  When these terrorist organizations feel 
their personal or national sovereignty has been violated, or that the transnational 
community of Muslims is being repressed by Western entities, including the United 
Nations, is when they react outside the normative behavior set by the international 
community. 
 One of the United States’ first targets in Yemen, Mohammed Saleh Mohammed 
Ali al Kazemi, was an AQAP deputy in Yemen’s Abyan province.  He had evaded JSOC 
forces for months, until they were able to track Kazemi to the village of al-Majulah, 
where a suspected terrorist training camp had been constructedclxxxviii.  A capture 
mission was ruled out in favor of a cruise missile strike on the camp.  The strike 
clxxxix.  Amongst the carnage lay pieces of a Tomahawk cruise 
missile demarcated with English.  Although this was not the first bombing the U.S. had 
ordered in Yemen, this particular instance was unique in its overt tactics and it 
instigated
was 
approved and launched December 17, 2009.  Rather than kill its intended target, the 
missile struck a Bedouin village, killing over forty people including fourteen women and 
twenty-one children
 the Yemenis redirection of blame and hatred towards the United States.  Not 
only was it clear that President Saleh was not providing for his people, but he was 
allowing other foreign governmental forces to violate their sovereignty by physically 
entering and killing at will.  When this became the general opinion of Yemenis towards 
the United States, the regional security threat became a national security threat. 
 Were the United States to continue, increase, or even decrease the number of 
RPV strikes, the level of terrorist threat that Yemen poses would likely continue or 
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increase.  Due to the importance revenge plays in tribal society, and high levels of pride 
and nationalism Yemen is characterized with, bombings and RPV strikes specifically 
could have a long lasting impact on U.S. national security.  The Yemeni diaspora, as 
demonstrated by Anwar al Awlaki, could also respond in dramatic ways in efforts to 
defend fellow Yemenis and fellow Muslims, forming a global jihad against the United 
States.  Gregory D. Johnsen described the situation: “When you kill people in Yemen, 
these are people who have families, they have clans, and they have tribes.  And what 
we’re seeing is that the United States might target a particular individual because they 
see him as a member of al Qaeda, but what’s happening on the ground is that he’s being 
defended as a tribesman”.  Johnsen pointed out the flaw in the U.S. aerial assassination 
campaign by stating “so you have people flowing into al Qaeda, not necessarily because 
they share the same ideology of al Qaeda, but just so that they can get revenge for their 
tribesman who has been killed in a drone strike”cxc.  Yemen’s insecurity continues to 
plague itself, allowing an environment in which violence breeds uncontrollably.  Just 
days following the strike in al-Majulah, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted his 
Christmas day bombing in Detroit.  AQAP’s numbers have more than tripled since this 
attempted attack, and the number of failed plots continues to climb. 
 While terrorist plots did recede significantly during the period of time when no 
RPV strikes were conducted from 2004-2008, these number are inconclusive being that 
al Qaeda in Yemen was nonoperational at this point..  Most of its members had been 
imprisoned or killed by the U.S. and Yemeni governments.  Al Qaeda’s initial formation 
in Yemen under the leadership of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi had been weak and 
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ineffective, although had the United States allowed Harethi to continue, the group might 
have developed into a more formidable threat.  As RPV strikes resumed and increased 
after 2009, so did AQAP’s activity.  AQAP attributed many of these attacks as 
counterattacks to RPV strikes, indicating that the strikes have in fact been a 
contributing factor to AQAP’s threat to the U.S.  Since the cruise missile strike in al-
Majulah, which gave Yemenis irrefutable proof of U.S. involvement, AQAP has been 
relentless in pursuing the U.S. through the century old tribal tradition of revenge. 
 Pakistan has always posed a threat to U.S. troops in Afghanistan.  Borders 
between these two states are very porous for tribal members who do not recognize the 
international delineation, often holding territory and dual citizenship in both states.  
Pakistani tribes readily traveled to Afghanistan to jihad against imposing Soviet troops 
in the 1980’s, and have now taken jihad against, in their views, invading U.S. troops.  
Pakistan has greatly contributed to homegrown terrorism by proving a haven for 
terrorist training camps, where indoctrinated foreign nationals travel specifically to 
learn skill sets characteristic to al Qaeda.  These individuals, often part of the 
homegrown terrorism phenomenon, are motivated by an ideology and seek to address 
perceived societal grievances they feel must be fulfilled through violent means
cxcii
cxci.  This 
was the case for the July 7, 2005 London bombers.  All but one of the bombers, 
Germaine Lindsay from Jamaica, originated from England.  Three of these four, 
excluding Lindsay, traveled to Pakistan, visiting several madrasa’s known for their 
radical teaching just prior to the bombing they committed which killed 52 and injured 
over 700 .  This case is far from unusual. 
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 Furthermore, since TTP has such a large presence in North and South Waziristan 
where the majority of RPV strikes takes place, it is difficult to discern who is a threat.  
This kind of mentality turns every resident of North and South Waziristan, including 
innocent civilians, into TTP members and terrorists.  On March 17, 2011, two RPV’s 
fired at least seven Hellfire missiles, killing between twenty-six and forty-four people in 
Datta Khel, in North Waziristancxciii.  Initially, the U.S. claimed that
cxciv
 all those who had 
been killed were militants, however, it was subsequently reported that the group had 
actually hit tribal elders engaged in a jirga.  The jirga was held to settle a dispute 
between two tribes over a chromite mine.  However, since the territory in dispute was 
controlled by the TTP, a high-ranking commander loyal to Taliban leader, Hafiz Gul 
Bahadur, officiated the meeting.  While Bahadur was killed in the strike, which was 
presumably the purpose of the mission, many civilians also perished in the blast.  The 
local population was infuriated by the deaths of so many respected tribal elders.  One 
survivor insisted “It wasn’t a militant gathering, but a meeting of tribal elders from 
Ismail Khan village to sort out some differences over a business deal.”  Other survivors 
corroborated that the jirga had been purely a business deal.  Surviving elders demanded 
blood money from the United States for their slain family members, and one elder 
claimed the attack “will create resentment among the locals and everyone might turn 
into suicide bombers.”  Another elder who survived the blast was quoted referring to 
the attack, “we are a people who wait one hundred years to exact revenge.  We never 
forgive our enemy.”  
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 If the past is any indication for a future trajectory of threatening terrorist 
activity, were kill/capture missions to be increased to partially or fully replace RPV 
strikes in Yemen, the threat would also decrease.  Yemen does harbor high profile 
members of AQAP, who do pose a significant threat to the United States and have 
attempted on multiple occasions to strike U.S. territory.  AQAP has proven that it is fully 
capable of replacing senior level militants, retaining loyal members over lengthy 
periods of time, and metamorphosing to survive.  However, their persistent strikes 
against the U.S. have been in response to RPV and cruise missiles strikes.  Were U.S. 
actions to be more covert, it is possible that the U.S. could repeatedly perform 
kill/capture missions against top AQAP officials, thereby removing the threat until 
AQAP can no longer function.  While this is theoretically the most effective option, 
kill/capture missions were impossible in the case of Kazemi, which led to the cruise 
missile strike in al-Majulah, as well as in the case of Awlaki. 
 In Pakistan, due to the fact that the state has the seventh largest population in 
the world coupled with the sheer volume of terrorist organizations, mostly in the FATA, 
kill/capture missions are simply an unfeasible option.  Each faction of the TTP has its 
own hierarchy, which, when added to the number of lower-level al Qaeda members in 
Pakistan, creates a daunting task when taken individually in kill/capture missions.  In 
addition, kill/capture missions could also result in cases of mistaken identity and 
accidental death, as has been the case for many RPV strikes including the March 17, 
2011 incident.  These individuals, particularly TTP members, have created little threat 
for the U.S. homeland, preferring to conduct terrorist attacks against their own state 
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and military.  Therefore, kill/capture missions would likely have no effect on U.S. 
national security, nor would it decrease terrorist activity within Pakistan.  Unlike in 
Yemen, where fewer covert kill/capture missions have been reported, Pakistanis have 
taken notice of covert U.S. affairs within the FATA and are deeply offended by the 
collateral damage, including destruction of property and civilian deaths.  Thus, 
increasing the policy would only work to further damage the relationship between the 
U.S. and the FATA. 
 Finally, a null hypothesis in Yemen and Pakistan would presumably create the 
same effect in each state.  Clearly it is difficult to extrapolate the exact causation 
between the cessation of the RPV campaign in Yemen and Pakistan to the level of 
terrorist activity.  However, by assessing previous lulls in strikes in both states, were 
the United States to end its RPV campaign in these two states, radicalization and 
terrorist attacks within Pakistan and Yemen would continue.  In Pakistan, during the six 
month lull from December 2013 till June 2014, there was a period of inactivity among 
TTP and al Qaeda militants; this was curtailed prior to the United States resuming 
attacks, demonstrating little correlation.  The United States has drastically limited the 
number of strikes in each state since their peak in 2011 and 2012 in Pakistan and 
Yemen, respectively.  Yet the level of violent extremism in each state has continued to 
grow.  Attacks against the U.S. specifically are often counterattacks to RPV strikes, 
which could mean that eventually, tribal grievances will be forgiven.  While terrorist 




PART VII: CONCLUSION 
 These findings have demonstrated that the argument revolving around RPV’s is 
relevant and necessary. Remotely piloted vehicles, armed or unarmed, are quickly and 
increasingly being used in the arsenal of unconventional warfare.  The United States has 
operated RPV’s not only in Yemen and Pakistan, but Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Libyacxcv.  Israel, China and Iran have all developed RPV’s, and even the non-state actor 
Hezbollah has flown at least two RPV’s over Israel.  Aside from the legal complications 
RPV’s impose on the International Community, it is just as important to determine 
whether or not armed RPV’s are an effective strategy of war and counterterrorism.   
Clearly, certain terrorist organizations in Yemen and Pakistan have proven that 
they do represent a significant enough threat to take action.  United States policy has 
dictated that the most appropriate action is to use the RPS, usually with the approval of 
the host state’s President, to circumscribe that threat and not risk American lives in the 
process.  While many analysts have scrutinized their legality and proliferation, the 
scope of this work has been to establish the basis of their use.  If RPV’s prove effective in 
two vastly differing states such as Yemen and Pakistan, then the discussion of their legal 
framework should continue.  However, if they are ineffective at reducing terrorist 
threats emerging from these two states, alternative policies were also explored.  While 
the armed RPV might be a tactical success in other locations and against other enemies, 
Yemen and Pakistan have been chosen to be representative for unconventional war 
between the United States and a non-state military actor. 
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 There have been no acts of sectarian terrorism committed on United States soil 
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks that were perpetrated by any terrorist organization 
originating in Yemen and Pakistan.  While some horrific acts of sectarian terrorism have 
been attributed or inspired by AQAP or the TTP, namely the Boston Marathon Bombing 
and the Fort Hood shooting, the perpetrators were not specifically affiliated, given 
orders or supplied materials by any terrorist organization.  Although the Taliban 
claimed responsibly for the attempted Times Square bombing in 2010, there is little 
actual evidence to support this claim.  Nidal Malik Hasan, the perpetrator behind the 
Fort Hood mass shooting in 2009, was in contact with Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki for six 
months prior to the attack.  The FBI intercepted 18 emails between the two men, in 
which Hasan would ask religious guidance on “when jihad is appropriate, and whether 
it is permissible if there are innocents killed in a suicide attack”cxcvi
cxcvii
cxcviii
, however they 
concluded that there was no content of concern .  This was the extent of Hasan’s 
involvement with any Pakistani or Yemeni terrorist organization.  Furthermore, Hasan 
never claimed or affiliated himself with AQAP.  AQAP, which has always been regarded 
as the most loyal to Osama bin Laden’s original construct, has plotted many attempted 
but ultimately failed terrorist attacks.  Pakistan’s terrorist cells are largely an implosion 
of political weakness; however they have been indirectly responsible for inspiring acts 
of homegrown terrorism, mostly in Europe.  The perpetrator in the attempted Times 
Square bombing, a native of Pakistan who had lived in the United States many years, 
had traveled back to Pakistan a few months prior to the attempt to train with the TTP 
specifically in bomb making . 
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United States policy has resulted in another sharp decrease in RPV strikes in 
both states, approaching strike numbers resembling those during the Bush 
Administration.  As al Qaeda in Yemen demonstrated the last time the United States 
underestimated their potential for bellicosity, al Qaeda used this time to become 
stronger.  As always, it is vital to excogitate that not every citizen of Yemen and Pakistan 
is a terrorist, nor even that every organization the United States labels as a terrorist 
organization possesses the intent to harm the United States.  As previously stated, there 
have been no successful terrorist attacks carried out by members of terrorist 
organizations based out of Yemen and Pakistan.  If the United States were to continue 
defensive security measures without becoming involved militarily, it would presumably 
result in a more effective national security.  Any military action against Pakistan and 
Yemen has shown little positive impact in the radicalization of these states. 
Unfortunately, due to the U.S. show of force in Yemen and Pakistan through not 
only RPV’s, but cruise missiles and covert CIA and JSOC missions, retaliation from both 
of these states will most likely continue despite alternative or similar policy 
adjustments.  While RPV strikes are successful killing machines, due to their inherent 
inaccuracy and threat to state sovereignty, the aerial assassination campaign has 
strained relations with tribal groups in Yemen and Pakistan.  Not only are RPV’s 
continuously striking organizations that demonstrate intrepid and persistent qualities 
that rebuild after each strike, they aid in their conviction against the United States.  It 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy of RPV strikes creating terrorists, and terrorist 
organization convincing tribespeople to violently seek revenge against their invader.  If 
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these relationships were to be repaired, their threat could be diminished through a joint 
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Created by Bill Roggio (The Long War Journal) 
Since 2004, the US has been conducting a covert program to target and kill al Qaeda and 
Taliban commanders based in Pakistan's lawless northwest. The program has targeted 
top al Qaeda leaders, al Qaeda's external operations network, and Taliban leaders and 
fighters that threaten both the Afghan and Pakistani states. Last updated on July 23, 
2014. http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hvts.php. 
Killed in 2014: 
Taj al Makki, Abu Abdurahman al Kuwaiti, and Fayez Awda al Khalidi 
The three al Qaeda operatives are said to be mid-level commanders. 
Date thought killed: July 10, 2014. 
 
Haji Gul, Mufti Sofian, and Commander Abu Bakar. 
Haji Gul was a senior Haqqani Network commander. Mufti Sofian and Commander Abu 
Bakar were senior commanders in the Afghan Taliban. 
Date reported killed: June 11-12, 2014. 
 
Killed in 2013: 
Abdul Rehman, Mufti Hamidullah Haqqani, and Maulvi Ahmed Jan 
The three men served as senior Haqqani Network commanders. Maulvi Ahmed Jan is 
said to be an aide to Sirajuddin Haqqani. Date reported killed: Nov. 21, 2013. 
 
Hakeemullah Mehdsud 
The emir of the Movement of the Taiban in Pakistan.  
Date killed: Nov. 1, 2013. 
 
Mullah Sangeen Zadran 
The deputy to Haqqani Network operational commander Sirajuddin Haqqani. He also 
served as the Taliban's shadow governor in Paktika province, Afghanistan.  
Date killed: Sept. 5, 2013. 
 
Abu Rashid, Muhammed Ilyas Kuwaiti, and Muhammed Sajid Yamani 
Three mid-level al Qaeda military trainers.  
Date killed: July 28, 2013. 
 
Abu Saif al Jaziri and Maulana Akhtar Zadran  
Abu Saif al Jaziri was a senior al Qaeda military trainer. Maulana Akhtar Zadran was a 
Haqqani Network commander.  
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Date killed: July 28, 2013. 
 
Waliur Rehman 
The deputy emir of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan and the group's leader in 
South Waziristan.  
Date killed: May. 28, 2013. 
 
Abu Ubaydah Abdullah al Adam 
Abu Ubaydah Abdullah al Adam is al Qaeda's intelligence chief and a propagandist for 
Vanguards of the Khorasan.  
Date thought killed: Either April 14 or April 17, 2013. 
 
Sheikh Yasin Al Kuwaiti 
A key al Qaeda paramilitary commander in the Shadow Army who operated in 
Pakistan's tribal areas.  
Date killed: Jan. 8, 2013. 
 
Wali Mohammed 
A commander who is said to have directed suicide operations for the Movement of the 
Taliban in Pakistan.  
Date killed: Jan. 6, 2013. 
 
Faisal Khan 
Khan was a mid-level commander in Hakeemullah Mehsud's Movement of the Taliban 
in Pakistan.  
Date killed: Jan. 3, 2013. 
 
Mullah Nazir, Atta Ullah, Rafey Khan, Rata Khan 
Mullah Nazir led the Taliban faction in the Wazir areas of South Waziristan. He 
identified himself as an al Qaeda leader and waged jihad in Afghanistan. Atta Ullah and 
Rafey Khan were Nazir's deputies; Rata Khan was a senior military commander.  
Date killed: Jan. 3, 2013. 
 
Killed in 2012: 
Mohammad Ahmed al Mansoor 
Mohammad Ahmed al Mansoor was a mid-level al Qaeda commander.  
Date killed: Dec. 9, 2012. 
 
Khalid bin Abdul Rahman al Husainan 
Husainan, who is also known as a Abu Zeid al Kuwaiti, served as a senior cleric and 
ideologue.  
Date thought killed: Dec. 7, 2012. 
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Abdul Rehman al Zaman Yemeni 
Abdul Rehman al Zaman Yemeni was a mid-level al Qaeda commander.  
Date thought killed: Dec. 1, 2012. 
 
Sheikh Abdul Bari 
Sheikh Abdul Bari was a mid-level al Qaeda commander.  
Date thought killed: Nov. 29, 2012. 
 
Hassan Ghul 
Hassan Ghul served as Osama bin Laden's emissary to Abu Musab al Zarqawi before his 
capture in Iraq in 2004. He was held by the US, transfered to Pakistan, released in 2007, 
and returned al Qaeda to serve as a senior operative.  
Date killed: Oct. 1, 2012. 
 
Abu Kasha al Iraqi and Fateh al Turki 
Abu Kasha al Iraqi served as a top al Qaeda leader in the Mir Ali area in North 
Waziristan. Fateh al Turki was a senior al Qaeda military leader.  
Date thought killed: Sept. 25, 2012. 
 
Badruddin Haqqani 
A top deputy and brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the operational commander of the 
Haqqani Network.  
Date killed: He is believed to have been killed in one of 5 strikes in August 2012. 
 
Abdul Shakoor Turkistani 
The leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party and al Qaeda's operations chief in Pakistan's 
tribal areas.  
Date thought killed: Aug. 24, 2012. 
 
Engineer Ahsan Aziz 
A Kashmiri jihadist linked to Hizbul Mujahideen who served as an al Qaeda commander.  
Date killed: Aug. 18, 2012. 
 
Abu Yahya al Libi 
Abu Yahya was a Libyan citizen, and served as al Qaeda's chief of staff and senior cleric 
and ideologue.  
Date killed: June 4, 2012. 
 
Abu Usman Adil 
Abu Usman Adil was the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and spearhead 
the expansion of the group's operations in Afghanistan.  




                                                                                                                                                                                        
Badr Mansoor 
Mansoor, a Pakistani citizen, served as al Qaeda's leader in Pakistan and a key link to 
the Taliban and Pakistani jihadist groups.  
Date killed: Feb. 9, 2012. 
 
Aslam Awan 
Awan, who is also known as Abdullah Khorasani, is a deputy to the leader of al Qaeda's 
external operations network and a Pakistani citizen.  
Date killed: Jan. 11, 2012. 
 
Qari Hussain Mehsud 
Qari Hussain was a top leader in the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan who also ran 
suicide training camps and planned suicide operations.  
The exact date of his death is unknown but he was rumored to have been killed in a US 
drone strike in January 2012. 
 
Killed in 2011: 
Hazrat Omar, Khan Mohammed, Miraj Wazir, and Ashfaq Wazir 
Omar was Mullah Nazir's brother who served as the group's operational commander in 
Afghanistan. Mohammed, a senior deputy to Nazir. Miraj Wazir and Ashfaq Wazir were 
senior commanders. 
Date killed: Oct. 27, 2011. 
 
Abu Miqdad al Masri 
A member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis who also was involved in al Qaeda's external 
operations. 
Date killed: Oct. 13-14, 2011 (exact date is unclear) 
 
Abd al Rahman al Yemeni 
A senior operative who was involved in al Qaeda's external operations network. 
Date killed: Oct. 13-14, 2011 (exact date is unclear). 
 
Jan Baz Zadran 
Siraj Haqqani's deputy who served as the number three for the terror network. 
Date killed: Oct. 13, 2011. 
 
Haleem Ullah 
A deputy commander to North Waziristan Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar. 
Date killed: Sept. 30, 2011. 
 
Abu Hafs al Shahri 
A senior al Qaeda leader who served as the operations chief for Pakistan. 
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Date killed: Sept. 11, 2011. 
 
Atiyah Abd al Rahman 
A senior al Qaeda leader who served as Osama bin Laden's chief of staff and a top 
operational commander. 
Date killed: Aug. 22, 2011. 
 
Ilyas Kashmiri 
The leader of al Qaeda's Lashkar al Zil and the operational commander of the Harkat ul 
Jihad-i-Islami. He also was a member of al Qaeda's external operatiosn council. 
Date killed: June 3, 2011. 
 
Abu Zaid al Iraqi 
A senior al Qaeda operative who served as the top financial officer in Pakistan. 
Date killed: Feb. 20, 2011. 
 
Killed in 2010: 
Ibn Amin 
A senior al Qaeda and Taliban military commander who led forces in Swat in Pakistan. 
Date reported killed: Dec. 17, 2010. 
 
Mohammed Usman 
Mohammed Usman was a key member of Ilyas Kashmiri's Brigade 313, al Qaeda's 
military formation in Pakistan, and also helped to unite al Qaeda with multiple Pakistani 
terror groups. He served as a key aide to Osama bin Laden. 
Date reported killed: One of several strikes in October 2010. 
 
Sheikh Fateh al Masri 
Al Qaeda's leader in Afghanistan and Pakistan (or the Khorasan). 
Date reported killed: Sept. 25, 2010. 
 
Saifullah Haqqani 
A Haqqani Network military commander in Afghanistan and a cousin of Siraj Haqqani. 
Date reported killed: Sept. 14, 2010. 
 
Qureshi 
An Islamic Jihad Group commander who trained Germans and other foreigners in North 
Waziristan and then sent them back to their home countries. 
Date reported killed: Sept. 8, 2010. 
 
Inayatullah 
A Taliban military commander based in North Waziristan. 
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Date reported killed: Sept. 3, 2010. 
 
Hamza al Jawfi 
An Egyptian who led the al Qaeda-allied Pakistani terror group known as Jundallah. 
Date killed: June 29, 2010. 
 
Abu Ahmed 
An al Qaeda military commander who conducted operations in Afghanistan. 
Date killed: June 19, 2010. 
 
Sheikh Ihsanullah 
An al Qaeda military commander who conducted operations in Afghanistan. 
Date killed: June 10, 2010. 
 
Ibrahim 
The commander of the Fursan-i-Mohammed Group, an al Qaeda group based in North 
Waziristan. 
Date killed: June 10, 2010. 
 
Osama bin Ali bin Abdullah bin Damjan al Dawsari 
A senior operative and key link with the Taliban in South Waziristan, Pakistan. He also 
facilitated operations in Afghanistan. 
Date killed: May 28, 2010. 
 
Mustafa Abu Yazid 
Yazid, who is also known and Sheikh Saeed al Masri, is al Qaeda's leader in Afghanistan 
and top financial official. 
Date killed: May 21, 2010. 
 
Sadam Hussein Al Hussami 
A senior operative in al Qaeda's external operations network who was involved in the 
suicide attack that killed seven CIA officials in Khost. Hussami is also known as 
Ghazwan al Yemeni. 
Date killed: March 8, 2010. 
 
Qari Mohammad Zafar 
A leader of the al Qaeda and Taliban-linked Fedayeen-i-Islam wanted by the US for 
attacking the US Consulate in karachi in 2006 
Date killed: February 24, 2010. 
 
Mohammed Haqqani 
A mid-level Haqqani Network military commander and brother of the group's top 
military commander Siraj Haqqani.  
Date killed: February 18, 2010. 
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Sheikh Mansoor  
An al Qaeda Shadow Army commander who was based in North Waziristan and 
operated in eastern Afghanistan.  
Date killed: February 17, 2010. 
 
Abdul Haq al Turkistani 
A member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis and the leader of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Party.  
Date killed: February 14, 2010. 
 
Abdul Basit Usman 
The US has a $1 million bounty on Abdul Basit Usman, an Abu Sayyaf master bomb 
maker, for conducting attacks that murdered civilians. Usman's death is unconfirmed, 
however. 
Date thought killed: January 14, 2010. 
 
Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim 
An Abu Nidal Organization operative who participated in killing 22 hostages during the 
1986 hijacking of Pan Am flight 73. 
Date reported killed: January 9, 2010. 
 
Mansur al Shami 
An al Qaeda ideologue and aide to Mustafa Abu Yazid. 
Date killed: Exact date is not known, he was last seen on As Sahab on January 4, 2010. 
 
Killed in 2009: 
Haji Omar Khan 
A senior Taliban leader in North Waziristan.  
Date killed: December 31, 2010 
 
Abdullah Said al Libi 
The top commander of the Lashkar al Zil, al Qaeda's Shadow Army. 
Date thought killed: December 17, 2009 (exact date is not known) 
 
Zuhaib al Zahib 
A commander in the Lashkar al Zil, al Qaeda's Shadow Army. 
Date killed: December 17, 2009 
 
Saleh al Somali 
The leader of al Qaeda's external network. 
Date killed: December 8, 2009 
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Abu Musa al Masri 
A senior al Qaeda explosive expert and trainer. 
Date killed: October 21, 2009 
 
Najmuddin Jalolov 
The leader of the Islamic Jihad Group, a breakaway faction of the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan. He was closely allied with al Qaeda. 
Date killed: September 14, 2009 
 
Maulvi Ismail Khan 
A military commander in the Haqqani Network. 
Date killed: September 8, 2009 
 
Mustafa al Jaziri 
A senior military commander for al Qaeda who sits on al Qaeda's military shura. 
Date killed: September 7, 2009 
 
Tahir Yuldashev  
The leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. 
Date killed: August 27, 2009 
 
Baitullah Mehsud 
The overall leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. 
Date killed: August 5, 2009 
 
Kifayatullah Anikhel 
A Taliban commander under Baitullah Mehsud. 
Date killed: July 7, 2009 
 
Mufti Noor Wali 
A suicide bomber trainer for the Taliban and al Qaeda. 
Date killed: July 3, 2009 
 
Khwaz Ali Mehsud 
A senior deputy to Baitullah Mehsud. 
Date killed: June 23, 2009 
 
Abdullah Hamas al Filistini 
A senior al Qaeda trainer. 
Date killed: April 1, 2009 
 
Osama al Kini (aka Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam)  
Al Qaeda's operations chief for Pakistan who was wanted for the 1998 bombings 
86 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 
Date killed: January 1, 2009 
 
Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan 
A senior aide to Osama al Kini who was wanted for the 1998 bombings against the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 
Date killed: January 1, 2009 
 
Sa'ad bin Laden 
One of Osama bin Laden's sons who served as a senior al Qaeda leader in Iran and was 
involved in several plots. He was considered to be a possible successor of Osama. The 
exact date of his death is not known. 
Killed in 2009 
 
Rashid Rauf 
A senior al Qaeda leader who directed plots in the United Kingdom from Pakistan. Date 
killed: The exact date is unknown, he was reported killed in 2008 but was later 
implicated in a plot in Europe in 2009. 
Killed in 2008: 
Abu Zubair al Masri 
Served as an explosives expert for al Qaeda as well as a leader. 
Date killed: November 21, 2008 
 
Abdullah Azzam al Saudi 
Served as liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest. 
Azzam facilitated al Qaeda's external operations network. He also served as a recruiter 
and trainer for al Qaeda. 
Date killed: November 19, 2008 
 
Abu Jihad al Masri 
The leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group and the chief of al Qaeda's intelligence branch, 
and directed al Qaeda's intelligence shura. He directed al Qaeda's external operations in 
Egypt. 
Date killed: October 31, 2008 
 
Khalid Habib 
The commander of the Lashkar al Zil or the Shadow Army, al Qaeda's paramilitary 
forces in Pakistan's northwest and Afghanistan. 
Date killed: October 16, 2008 
 
Abu al Hasan al Rimi 
A senior al Qaeda operative. 
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Date killed: October 2008 - exact date unknown 
 
Abu Ubaidah al Tunisi 
An al Qaeda military commander who fought against the Russians in Afghanistan. 
Date killed: September 17, 2008 
 
Abu Musa 
An al Qaeda operative from Saudi Arabia. 
Date killed: September 8, 2008 
 
Abu Qasim 
An al Qaeda operative from Egypt. 
Date killed: September 8, 2008 
 
Abu Hamza 
An explosives expert from Saudi Arabia who served as al Qaeda's commander in 
Peshawar. 
Date killed: September 8, 2008 
 
Abu Haris 
A senior al Qaeda military commander from Syria who led more than 250 Arab and 
Afghan fighters under the guise of the Jaish al Mahdi in Helmand province. He became al 
Qaeda's operations chief in the tribal areas in 2008.  
Date killed: September 8, 2008 
 
Abu Wafa al Saudi 
An al Qaeda commander and logistician. 
Date killed: September 4, 2008 
 
Abdul Rehman 
A local Taliban commander in the Wana region in South Waziristan. 
Date killed: August 13, 2008 
 
Abu Khabab al Masri 
The chief of al Qaeda's weapons of mass destruction program and a master bomb 
maker. 
Date killed: July 28, 2008 
 
Abu Mohammad Ibrahim bin Abi al Faraj al Masri 
A religious leader, close to Abu Khabab al Masri. 
Date killed: July 28, 2008 
 
Abdul Wahhab al Masri 
A senior aide to Abu Khabab al Masri. 
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Date killed: July 28, 2008 
 
Abu Islam al Masri 
Aide to Abu Khabab al Masri. 
Date killed: July 28, 2008 
 
Abu Sulayman Jazairi 
The chief of al Qaeda's external network. Jazairi was a senior trainer, an explosives 
expert, and an operational commander tasked with planning attacks on the West. 
Date killed: May 14, 2008 
 
Dr. Arshad Waheed (aka Sheikh Moaz) 
A mid-level al Qaeda leader. 
Date killed: March 16, 2008 
 
Abu Laith al Libi 
Senior military commander in Afghanistan and the leader of the reformed Brigade 055 
in al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army. 
Date killed: January 29, 2008 
 
Killed in 2007: 
No senior al Qaeda or Taliban leaders or operatives were reported killed during the 
strikes in 2007. 
 
Killed in 2006: 
Liaquat Hussain 
Second-in-command of the Bajaur TNSM. 
Date killed: October 30, 2006 
 
Imam Asad 
Camp commander for the Black Guard, al Qaeda's elite bodyguard for Osama bin Laden 
and Ayman al Zawahiri. Asad was a Chechen with close links to Shamil Basayev. 
Date killed: March 1, 2006 
 
Killed in 2005: 
Abu Hamza Rabia 
Al Qaeda's operational commander. He was involved with two assassination plots 
against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. 
Date killed: December 1, 2005 
 
Haitham al Yemeni 
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A senior al Qaeda's explosives expert who also is thought to have been close to Osama 
bin Laden and Abu Faraj al Libi. 
Date killed: May 15, 2005 
 
Killed in 2004: 
Nek Mohammed 
A senior Taliban commander in South Waziristan who had links to Osama bin Laden 
and Mullah Omar. 
Date killed: June 18, 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
